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Abstract 
 The thesis focuses on the contemporary ‘animalism vs. neo-Lockeanism’ 
debate on personal identity over time. I will look at Noonan’s defence on behalf of 
neo-Lockeanism against the version of animalism formulated and popularised by 
Olson (1997, 2003, 2007). Noonan argues for neo-Lockeanism (1989/2003, 
2010a,1998) by rejecting the animalists’ thinking animal argument. In doing so, the 
neo-Lockean theorist commits to claims that give rise to the epistemic problem: 
how do I know which thinker is me, given the neo-Lockean claim that the thinking 
animal and the Lockean person are numerically distinct, but qualitatively identical 
entities capable of occupying the same temporal-spatial location? In response, 
Noonan devises personal pronoun revisionism (or the linguistic solution) as an 
attempt to resolve the problem: personal pronouns don’t refer to the thinker who 
thinks the I-thought e.g. the thought that ‘I am a person’, but instead they refer to 
the person who thinks the I-thought. According to the neo-Locekan view, since i) 
you know that you are a person viz. ’you’ refers to a person and ii) persons are 
Lockean persons you can know that the thinker who is a person, the Lockean 
person, is you viz. ‘you’ always refers to the Lockean person not the thinking 
animal. Therefore, the epistemic problem is resolved since the question answers 
itself in the proposed semantic rule for the reference of personal pronouns. I argue 
that for considering problems of de se attitudes—propositional attitudes (knowing 
that, thinking that, believing that etc.) held towards propositions/beliefs identified 
by I-utterances such as ‘I am hungry’, ‘I want to have some ice-cream’ etc., 
Noonan’s response to the epistemic problem is not adequately motivated. With the 
epistemic problem unsolved, we have strong reasons for refuting neo-Lockeanism. 
 This thesis will have the following structure: In Section 1 I discuss Olson’s 
animalism as a position on personal identity. I will explain how Noonan’s refutation 
of the thinking animal argument leads to the epistemic problem as part of the 
broader thinking animal problem. Section 2 and 3 discuss this problem and 
Noonan’s proposed solution, personal pronoun revisionism, to it. Section 4 is an 
extended exposition of Noonan’s proposal. In Section 5 I argue that Noonan’s 
proposal fails for considering the problem of de se attitudes. Finally, I conclude 
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that with the problems Noonan’s account faces, we have strong reasons to reject 
Noonan’s neo-Lockeanism. 
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Abstract (Estonian) 
 Magistritöö teema on isiku identiteet ajas ja selle kohta käiv kaasaegne 
“animalism versus neolockeanism” debatt. Uurimise alla võetakse Noonani 
neolockeanismi pooldav argument Olsoni (1997, 2003, 2007) poolt formuleeritud 
ja populariseeritud animalismi versioon vastu. Noonan kaitseb neolockeanismi 
(1989/2003, 2010a,1998), hüljates animalistide nn mõtleva looma argumendi. Nii 
tehes kirjutab see neolockeist alla argumentidele, mis on pannud aluse nn 
episteemilisele probleemile: kuidas saab mõtleja identiteedi kindlaks määrata, kui 
neolockeistide järgi on "mõtlev loom" ja "Locke'i isik" arvuliselt erinevad, kuid 
kvalitatiivselt identsed entiteedid, kes võivad eksisteerida samas ajalis-ruumilises 
asukohas. Vastusena loob Noonan  nn isikulise asesõna revisionismi (või 
lingivistilise lahenduse) kui katse see probleem lahendada. Isikulised asesõnad ei 
viita mõtlejale (the thinker), kes mõtleb nn mina-mõtte (I-thought) näit mõtte "mina 
olen isik", vaid need viitavad hoopis isikule (the person), kes mõtleb mina-mõtte. 
Neolockeistliku vaate järgi, kuna i) sa ei tea, et sina oled isik viz. "sina" viitab 
isikule ja ii) isikud on Locke'i isikd, seega saad teada, et mõtleja, kes on isik 
(Locke'i isik), on sina viz. "sina" viitab alati Locke'i isikule, mitte mõtlevale loomale. 
Niisiis on episteemiline probleem lahendatud, sest küsimus vastab iseenesele 
ettepandud semantilises reeglis. Väidan, et de se suhtumise (st propositsiooniline 
suhtumine (teadma, mõtlema, uskuma etc), mis on suunatud mina-ütlustele nagu 
"olen näljane") probleemide vaatluse alla võtmiseks ei ole Noonani vastus 
episteemilisele probleemile piisavalt põhjendatud. Kuna episteemiline probleem on 
lahendamata, on meil tungivalt põhjust neolockeanism kõrvale lükata. 
 Magistritöö ülesehitus on järgmine: Osas 1 kirjeldan Olsoni animalismi kui 
seisukohtavõttu isiku identiteedi suhtes. Seletan, kuidas Noonani vastuväide nn 
mõtleva looma argumendile viib välja (osana laiemast mõtleva looma probleemist) 
episteemilise probleemini. Osades 2 ja 3 vaatlen seda probleemi ja sellele 
Noonani poolt pakutud lahendust, nn isikulise asesõna revisionismi. Osa 4 on 
Noonani väite jätkatud seletus. Section 4 is an extended exposition of Noonan’s 
proposal.  
 Osas 5 väidan, et Noonani ettepanekul ei õnnestu lahendada de se 
suhtumise (de se attitudes) probleemi. Kokkuvõttes järeldan, et võttes arvesse 
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Noonani väidetega kaasnevaid proleeme, on meil tugev põhjus hüljata Noonani 
neolockeism. 
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1. Overview: Animalism & the Thinking Animal Problem 
 The epistemic problem, which is part of the thinking animal problem, was a 
problem posed in response to the opponents of animalism, a view on personal 
identity formulated and popularised by Olson (1997:106-09, 2003:325-30, 
2007:29-39). As a proponent of the neo-Lockean account on personal identity 
(1989/2003, 2010a,1998) Noonan addresses the problem posed by the animalist. 
In response, he develops so-called ‘personal pronoun revisionism’ by (Olson 
2007) or the ‘linguistic solution’ by (Olson 2002). In this section, I will explain the 
thinking animal problem and how personal pronoun revisionism is supposed to 
(re)solve the problem. However, to get to the heart of the debate between Olson 
and Noonan, we first need to understand their respective views. I shall begin by 
presenting Olson’s position, animalism, and the argument for it. It will soon be 
clear why the rejection of it will lead to the thinking animal problem. 
 Olson’s animalism is backed by the thinking animal argument. It is a version 
of the biological criterion of personal identity, the tenant of which can be 
summarised in the slogan: we are animals.  
 
The thinking animal argument  
“It follows from these apparently trite observations that you are an animal. In a nutshell, the 
argument is this: (1) There is a human animal sitting in your chair. (2) The human animal 
sitting in your chair is thinking. (If you like, every human animal sitting there is thinking.) (3) 
You are the thinking being sitting in your chair. The one and only thinking being sitting in 
your chair is none other than you. Hence, you are that animal. That animal is you. And 
there is nothing special about you: we are all animals. 
 
1. (!x)(x is a human animal & x is sitting in your chair) 
2. (x)((x is a human animal & x is sitting in your chair) --> x is thinking)  
3. (x)((x is thinking & x is sitting in your chair) --> x = you) 
4. (!x)(x is a human animal & x = you)”  
 
(Olson 2003, p. 326) 
 
 Let the label ‘animalism’ can be understood as such. The defining feature of 
human animals is that they persist by means of preserving certain biological 
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properties e.g. the biological structure and the organs that are essential to the 
function of the central nerve system. If the conclusion, we are animals, is true, it 
follows that the persistence conditions of us are, like human animals, purely 
biological. Based on this animalist claim, Olson further claims that psychological 
connections are neither sufficient nor necessary for the persistence of us: i) we 
can survive total amnesia; ii) the preservation of psychological contents does not 
suffice for our survival in the future (1997: 107). Animalism defined as such falls 
under ‘the biological approach’1. 
 Let us turn to the rival view to animalism, neo-Lockeanism, according to 
which the persistence conditions of persons2 are purely psychological. In other 
words, it is sufficient for a person to persist over time if certain psychological 
connections or traits are preserved. This is a position under the ‘psychological 
approach’3.  
 The two views are ultimately incompatible. Neo-Lockeanism identifies 
persons as ‘psychological continuers’ and animalism identifies persons (us) as 
‘biological continuers’. In virtue of having different persistence conditions, 
psychological continuers are conceptually distinct from biological continuers. 
Furthermore, there are cases in which they actually come apart in terms of 
occupying different spatial-temporal location. For example, human animals have 
foetus stages in which no mental activity is considered present. Presumably, 
embryos will develop over time up to the point that mental activities are undeniably 
said to exhibit. This example shows that the biological continuer in fact comes into 
existence earlier than the psychological continuer. Suppose the talk of temporarily 
coincident entities, we may say that they coincide for a certain period of time, and, 																																																								
1 Any attempt that analyses personal identity in terms of pure biological facts is defined as an 
account under the ‘biological Approach’. It shall not be confused with the ‘bodily Approach’ since an 
animal’s body is different than an animal: when at death, the animal’s corpse is qualified as ‘the 
body’ or ‘the animal’s body’ but not ‘the animal’. In such a case, we may say the animal becomes 
the corpse, instead of saying the animal is the corpse. The introduction of the biological approach 
and bodily approach is meant to respect just this difference. Under the bodily approach defined as 
such it is right to identify the person as the dead animal body or as the corpse, but under the 
biological approach a person is identified as an animal, something that has, if not essentially so, 
certain dynamic biological functions, but not identified as the body or as the corpse. 
2 I use “person” and personal pronouns such as “I”, “we” as synonyms here. Noonan takes it as 
trivially true (2010c). As revealed in Section 6, this is not as obvious as Noonan takes it. 
3 Broadly speaking, any attempt that analyses personal identity in terms of pure psychological facts 
is defined as an account under the psychological approach. 
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very often, the psychological continuer will go out of existence first. Due to the 
existence of these cases in which they don’t coincide permanently viz. coming into 
and going out of existence at the same time, it is a contingent fact that they could 
become actually distinct beings: temporally distinct in the above mentioned 
example, spatially distinct in the prince/cobbler case by Locke (see below). 
 While the existence of human animals as biological organisms is granted by 
common sense, the existence of psychological continuers or Lockean persons 
needs further support. This is typically done by thought experiments. A classic 
case for this is the prince/cobbler case by John Locke4. 
 
● Prince/Cobbler case 
Imagine there are two persons, the prince and the cobbler. The memories of 
the prince will be transferred to the cobbler’s body, and subsequently the 
cobbler-body person will have all and only the memories of the prince’s. That is 
to say, the cobbler-body person will remember himself as the prince. Now 
when the memory transfer process has finished, who is the person in the shoe 
of the cobbler’s body, the prince or the cobbler?  
 
 Locke subscribes to the psychological approach, and argues that the 
cobbler-body person is the prince. He thinks that the later cobbler-body person 
with the prince’s memories is sufficient for being identified as the prince, albeit he 
has ‘switched’ his body. The criterion for personal identity that underlines Locke’s 
treatment of the case is the memory criterion. It implies that there is an entity x 
such that it persists in virtue of psychological connections, who is located where 
the prince’s body is before the memory transfer and then where the cobbler’s body 
is. For historical reasons, let us refer to entities of this sort as ‘psychological 
continuers’ or ‘Lockean persons’. 
 The animalist must reject accounts of the psychological approach due to his 
adherence to the biological approach. In the prince/cobbler case, the cobbler-body 
is clearly not biologically connected with the prince-body person. The animalist 
theory does not allow the identification of the later cobbler-body person to the 																																																								
4 Locke(1694/1975), chapter XXVII, “Of Identity and Diversity” 
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earlier person, the prince. In fact, the animalist must deny such identification. 
Prima facie, the prince/cobbler case is a case showing the existence of Locaken 
persons as psychological continuers because we have the intuition that persons 
are psychological continuers regarding cases that are structurally the same. 
Whether the Lockean person or the human animal (=the prince’s body) is the 
person we call ‘the prince’ sums up the heart of the debate between the biological 
approach and the psychological approach. 
 I shall use the terms ‘biological continuers’ and ‘human animals’ to refer to 
entities such that their persistence conditions are purely biological; and 
‘psychological continuers’ and ’Lockean persons’ to refer to entities such that their 
persistence conditions are purely psychological. ‘Biological continuer’ and 
’psychological continuer’ are specially reserved for discourses that are explicitly 
about diachronic identity. In the prince/cobbler case, we say that there is a 
psychological continuer who is located where the prince’s body is before the 
memory transfer takes place and then stays in the cobbler’s body; and there is 
also a biological continuer who is located in the prince’s body before and after the 
memory transfer (presumably, another biological continuer for the cobbler’s body 
as well). Locke, in this case, identifies the psychological continuer as the person to 
whom we refer by the name “the prince”, and therefore the biological continuer 
(what we may call ‘the body’) is ruled out as a person by his memory criterion.  
 
● Persistence conditions 
Biological continuers:  purely biological  
Psychological continuers: purely psychological  
 
 Moving back to the debate between Olson and Noonan, the animalist 
disagrees with the neo-Lockean theorist on whether persons are biological 
continuers or psychological continuers (it is important to note that this is, however, 
not an accurate presentation of Olson’s position because it neglects i) subtle 
differences between personal pronouns, and the terms ‘person’ and ‘people’ that 
Olson draws; ii) Noonan agrees that human animals could have been 
psychological continuers. But for my present purposes, I shall not complicate the 
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matter, and proceed with the above framing). With this granted, we can formulate 
their views as follows: 
 
● Animalism 
All persons are biological continuers/human animals 
 
● Neo-Lockeanism 
All persons are psychological continuers/Lockean persons 
 
 Given animalism, it follows that at least some of us are indeed human 
animals. Therefore, the neo-Lockean claim that all persons are psychological 
continuers is false. To defend his position, Noonan must seek a way to resist the 
thinking animal argument that supports the animalist claim. 
 However, refuting the thinking animal argument is shown to be no easy task 
since none of its premises seems obviously problematic. Furthermore, denying 
either one of them would lead the neo-Lockean theorist to commit certain counter-
intuitive claims, which, in turn, reveals inadequacy of neo-Lockeanism in 
reconciling our common-sense beliefs with philosophical discoveries as compared 
to its rival view animalism. 
 For example, premise (1) asserts the existence of a human animal that has 
certain biological features. Unless some radical view on the external world can be 
granted5, it is hard to see how one can deny the existence of such human animal 
claimed by premise (1). Premise (2) says that such animal can think. This can be 
disputed, however. Shoemaker thinks this is false6. 
																																																								
5 An idealist, for instance, would reject the existence of the thinking animal as a material object that 
exists in the external world. 6	On his view (1999a,1999b) human animals cannot think because the physical properties that 
determine the mentality of a person are only realised in the person, although the person, the 
human animal, and the coincident body (corpse-to-be) are all processors of such physical 
properties. What underlines this conclusion is i) the worry that the animalist may also face the 
epistemic problem (see section 2 below) for consideration of the corpse (the corpse problem, 
discussed in Olson 2004), ii) the metaphysics of properties and the nature of realisation 
Shoemaker independently defends (Shoemaker 1984, 1998). So the version of neo-Lockeanism 
Shoemaker endorses differs from that Noonan endorses. While Shoemaker’s account and the 
underlying corpse problem surely worth of further investigation by their light, I would instead focus 
on the debate between Olson and Noonan. I shall proceed with the rather intuitive claim that 
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● Thinking animal assumption 
Animals the persistence conditions of which are purely biological have the 
capacity to think 
 
 Noonan, unlike Shoemaker, endorses the thinking animal assumption 
above7. Since both Noonan and Olson agree that premise (2) is true, it is not the 
premise to fault at8. 
 Noonan denies the identification that follows from premise (3), and claims 
the following: “I am a thinking being and, of course, the thinking animal too, but I 
am not that animal”. Quite obviously, Noonan does not operate with the same 
ontology that the thinking animal argument supposes. The intent of the argument 
is that the thinking animal seems to be the only being at the location where you 
believe you are in, and thereby “you are that animal and that animal is you”. 
According to the animalist, Noonan’s reply will lead to the thinking animal problem, 
which consists of the following apparently highly counter-intuitive implications.  
 
● INCOHERENCE: The neo-Lockean theorist’s acceptance of the thinking 
animal assumption and his subscription to the psychological approach to 
personal identity are incoherent. Given thinking animal assumption, a thinking 
animal must be a person after all in virtue of the fact that it can think just like 																																																																																																																																																																								
human animals are capable of thinking granted, and set aside the corpse problem from the main 
discussion.  
7 (2010c, p.94) “(4) All normal healthy adult human animals are thinkers of true firstperson 
thoughts. This is what the animalist urges, rightly, I think, on the neo-Lockean as an evident 
common-sense truth” 
8 By that I don’t mean premise (2) is true, and it should be reminded that Shoemaker (1999a, 
1999b) offer arguments for thinking that it is false. Initially, the worry stems from the corpse 
problem: “Olson rightly ridicules the suggestion that the fetus goes out of existence when the 
person comes into existence. But it seems equally ridiculous to say that the corpse is something 
that comes into existence at death” (1999a, p.499) Hence, it seems that the body i.e. corpse-to-be 
is something that exists before my death and is such that it coincides with the person and the 
human animal. If this is so, then the body (corpse-to-be) must share the physical properties that the 
human animal (the person) has. If the realization of those physical properties will determine the 
mentality of the human animal, they must be also realised in the body (corpse-to-be) as well. 
Hence, we have too many minds problem i.e. the epistemic problem for the animalist himself. Since 
my focus is on the neo-Lockean claim that the Lockean person and the human animal are 
coincident thinkers, which I shall argue against in section 5, I shall at this moment suppose the 
truth of premise (2) and proceed. 
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the Lockean person does. If the Lockean person satisfies a psychological 
criterion and thereby is a person, so does the thinking animal. However, human 
animals are, after all, not Lockean persons because they differ in their 
persistence conditions. “[S]o the neo-Lockean’s attempt to identify the 
persistence conditions for persons collapses into incoherence, since he has to 
acknowledge different kinds of person with different persistence conditions – as 
it were person-persons and animal-persons.” (Noonan 2010c, p.93) 
 
● MULTIPLICITY (Too Many Thinkers case): Given premise (1) and (2), the 
neo-Locekan theorist would endorse that there is indeed a thinking animal 
located at where he is. But, the neo-Lockean theorist would not identify himself 
as the thinking animal because he is a person and that a thinking animal is not 
a person (human animals can at best be animal-person on pain of 
incoherence). It entails that there also exists an entity that coincides with the 
thinking animal occupying the same spatial-temporal location. This is this entity 
that the neo-Lockean theorist identifies persons with: Lockean persons. The 
neo-Locekan theorist would say that it is the Lockean person that is the person 
with whom he is numerically identical. Therefore, neo-Lockeanism entails 
multiplicity and the sharing of thoughts: there are two thinking beings, the 
thinking animal and the Lockean person, occupying the same spatial-temporal 
location and thinking the same thoughts. 
 
● MYTH: Quantifying the coincident period, the thinking animal should have 
whatever cognitive capacities that the Lockean person can be said to have. Its 
thoughts have whatever complexity and sophistication the Lockean person 
has. In fact, during their coincident period, the thinking animal and the Lockean 
person have exact same thoughts, beliefs, desires, traits etc. Yet, the neo-
Locekan theorist claims that they are distinct coincident entities. How can we 
make sense of this inflated ontology with this qualification on the capacities that 
the Lockean person and the thinking animal both possess? 
 
 The above three challenges encompass concerns from various 
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philosophical angles, namely: “(epistemic) how do I know that I am the Lockean 
person but not the human animal sitting here entertaining a thought shared with 
the Locekan person?”, “(metaphysical) how can we make sense of the claim that 
two numerically distinct beings can occupy the same space?”, “(ontological) what 
is the relationship between the Lockean person and the human animal with whom 
it coincides?”, “(semantic) which one of them does the personal pronoun “I” in a 
sentence “I am sitting” uttered by the Lockean person (or by the thinking animal) 
refer to?” These are difficult questions that make up the so-called thinking animal 
problem because they have the same root: they arise from the denial of the 
thinking animal argument. The thinking animal problem motivates the refutation of 
neo-Lockeanism by reducio ad absurdum:  
 
Argument by reductio against neo-Lockeanism 
1. If neo-Lockeanism is true, the thinking animal problem follows 
2. The claims entailed by the thinking animal problem are absurd  
3. Therefore, neo-Lockeanism is false 
 
 The neo-Lockean theorist must account for the concerns under the thinking 
animal problem and explain them to satisfactory degrees so as to resist the 
refutation of neo-Lockeanism by the above argument by reductio ad absurdum. 
 I shall now give an overview of Noonan’s responses on behalf of neo-
Lockeanism. 
 
● INCORHERENCE: Noonan rejects the animalist inference that due to its 
present sophistication in thoughts, the thinking animal is thereby a person. 
Noonan argues that he is not committed to the incoherency charged by Olson. 
He draws attention to the different persistence conditions between the thinking 
animal as a biological continuer and the Lockean person as a psychological 
continuer. In his view, to say that an entity x is a person is to say something 
about x’s entire history including x’s past, present, and future9. The thinking 
animal as a biological continuer has different history than the Lockean person 																																																								
9 Noonan 2010c p.97 
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as a psychological continuer has: they, at least, as a matter of contingent fact, 
differ from their past histories, for the thinking animal as a biological continuer 
has a foetal stage, but the Lockean person as a psychological continuer 
doesn’t. The substantial neo-Lockean claim is the following de dicto necessary 
truth: if x is a psychological continuer, x is a person. The period of existence 
being quantified in the discussion includes the coincident and non-coincident 
periods. Given this, it entails that the thinking animal does not satisfy the neo-
Lockean de dicto principle above, which governs the concept of persons. Even 
if the thinking animal as a biological continuer does satisfy the psychological 
criterion for certain period (the period when the Lockean person as a 
psychological continuer also exists), in virtue of having different persistence 
conditions the animal is not, as a matter of de dicto truth, a psychological 
continuer.  
 
● MULTIPLICITY: Multiplicity is accepted by Noonan10. However, while it is true 
that during the coincident period, the thinking animal and the Lockean person 
occupy the same spatial-temporal location, it is not true if we quantify over their 
entire histories. That is to say, they don’t occupy exact same temporal location. 
Noonan defends the four-dimensionalist thesis that persons are perdurers11: 
persons are objects that comprise of maximal temporal aggregates of person-
stages (temporal parts of persons). This commitment to the four-dimensional 
ontology allows him to explain the multiplicity as follows: there are some 
temporal stages such that they are shared by the thinking animal as a 
biological continuer and the Lockean person as a psychological continuer. 
MULTIPLICITY would be difficult to accept if the claim is that permanently 
coincident beings are still numerically distinct beings. But this is not Noonan’s 
claim, and the contingent facts concerning the sequence of their coming into 
and going out of existence tell us that we are not dealing with permanently 
coincide entities. Noonan argues that this is not an ad hoc response to the 
thinking animal problem since four-dimensionalism can be defended 
																																																								
10 Noonan 2012 p.317 
11 Noonn 1989/2003 p. 118-124 
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independent of the discussion of personal identity over time12. 
 
● MYTH: Noonan claims that the temporarily coincident thinking animal and 
Lockean person are cognitively identical i.e. qualitatively indistinguishable in 
their cognitive behaviours13. Nevertheless, they are numerically distinct entities 
due to the fact that they have different persistence conditions and the above-
mentioned contingent fact they are in fact not permanently coincided14. What 
we have is a case in which two thinking beings share the same thoughts. 
 
 As the responses indicate, INCOHERENCE is related to the discussion of 
discovering persistence conditions for persons. This is related to Noonan’s view on 
thought experiments and the structure of the concept of personal identity. 
MULTIPLICITY turns on the ontological question whether persons persist as 
endurers or perdureres i.e. whether persons have temporal parts. This 
corresponds to Noonan’s discussion of the possibility of indeterminacy in personal 
identity, the consideration for which leads to the four-dimensional view on the 
persistence of persons15. Finally, MYTH leads to the specific thesis personal 
pronoun revisionism devised to respond to the epistemic problem. In this thesis, I 
wish to focus only on MYTH (see appendix for some details about Noonan’s 
defences for the concept of personal identity and four-dimensionalism).  
 One of the criticisms Olson (2007) makes to Noonan’s response to the 
MYTH challenge is that it creates an irresolvable epistemic problem (hereafter the 
epistemic problem): given MULTIPLICITY and the coincident thinkers being 
cognitively identical, how do I know which of the thinkers is me? For all I know, I 
can comprehend I-utterances, being able to express I-thoughts, and I am a 
person. But following the neo-Lockean view, there also exists a distinct human 																																																								
12 Noonan 1989/2003 p.118-124 
13 Noonan 2012, p.317 
14 Noonan 2010c p.93 note 4 thinks that permanently coincident objects are identical. “I think the 
permanently coincident objects are identical and I do not think that merely future differences can 
determine whether something is now a thinker. 
15 “The key point is that the only way to make comprehensible the idea that statements of identity 
can be indeterminate in truth-value is by appeal to the idea of semantic indecision. But in order to 
apply this idea to the explanation of indeterminacy in statements of identity over time one has to 
acknowledge ontological commitments which fit more comfortably with the four-dimensional 
theorist’s framework than with its rejection” Noonan 1989/2003 p.118 
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animal as a biological continuer with which my thoughts are shared. The thinking 
animal can think just like me. How do I know if I am the person thinking truly but 
not the animal thinking falsely that it is a person?  
 The epistemic problem and Noonan’s response will be the focus of our 
attension in the remaining of the discussion. I shall first explain in more detail what 
is at issue, and then critically examine Noonan’s personal pronoun revisionism / 
linguistic solution (I will speak of them interchangeably) as a follow-up response to 
the problem. Ultimately, I argue that Noonan’s proposal, despite its ingenuity, fails 
for considerations of the problems of de se attitudes. 
2. The Epistemic Problem 
 In this section I will take a closer look at the epistemic problem introduced in 
the last section. What underlines the epistemic problem is Noonan’s acceptance of 
MULTIPLICITY viz. there are two numerically distinct but qualitatively identical 
entities that “co-inhabit” for a certain period of time the same spatial location, a 
Lockean person and a human animal. MULTIPLICITY a.k.a. the too many thinkers 
case follows from the (neo-Lockean theorist’s) commitments below: 
 
1. The persistence conditions of human animals (biological continuers) are 
purely biological;  
2. The persistence conditions of Lockean persons (psychological continuers) 
are purely psychological; 
3. Lockean persons can think; 
4. Human animals can think; 
5. In normal cases, each Lockean person coincides with a human animal for a 
certain period such that the Lockean person as a psychological continuer 
comes into existence later than the human animal as a biological continuer 
(presumably, the psychological continuer will go out of existence before the 
biological continuer) 
 
 (1) is backed by the common sense truth that there are human animals 
which can exist over time; (2) is backed by cases structurally the same as the  
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prince/cobbler case by Locke. (3) follows from (2), and (4) is the thinking animal 
assumption agreed mutually by Noonan and Olson. (1) to (4) leads to (5): 
MULTIPLICITY / the too many thinkers case. But MULTIPLICITY by itself is neural 
to neo-Lockeanism and animalism, for it does not tell us whether persons are 
thinking animals or Lockean persons. The addition of the thesis: all persons are 
psychological continuers completes Noonan’s neo-Lockeanism (again, see 
appendix for details). 
 From (5), (3), and (4) (and Noonan’s materialist view on persons, see CI in 
section 6.1), we can infer that the thinking animal is a cognitive peer with the 
Lockean person during their period of coincidence in the sense that they are 
cognitively identical thinkers sharing the same thoughts. Let us employ the label 
‘too many thinkers case’ for the MULTIPLICTY case as such: 
 
● Too many thinkers case 
On the neo-Lockean view, whenever a Lockan person thinks, the “co-
inhabited” human animal thinks in the Lockean person as well. They both 
entertain the same thoughts. They are thus in this respect cognitively identical. 
But, they are numerically distinct due to having different persistence conditions 
and the contingent fact concerning the existence of human animals and 
Lockean persons.  
 
 According to Olson, the too many thinkers case leads to the epistemic 
problem. 
 
“…it is hard to see how you could ever know which thinker you are, the animal or the 
person (the one with psychological identity conditions): the epistemic problem”  
 
“that thing [thinking human animal] would seem to be psychologically and epistemically 
indistinguishable from you, to the point of having the same beliefs about itself as you have 
about yourself, and the same grounds for them. (…) even though there are beings of the 
sort we take ourselves to be sitting in our chairs and thinking our thoughts, we can have no 
way of knowing whether we are those beings.” 
 
(Olson 2002 p.2, p.4) 
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 This is the epistemic problem. The problem arises due to Noonan’s 
acceptance of the existence of multiple thinkers and their being cognitively 
identical. If I am a person on the neo-Lockean view, there is a thinking animal that 
is “psychologically and epistemically indistinguishable from me”. How can I know 
which one of the thinkers is me? This leads to a form of scepticism because many 
of my deep convictions such as beliefs about myself turn out to be ungrounded: I 
certainly have beliefs about myself and it seems to be trivially true that I am a 
person. But the temporally coincident thinking animal and Lockean person are 
cognitively identical. If, following Noonan, only the Lockean person as a 
psychological continuer is a person, how do I know that I am, in the sense of 
numerical identity, the Lockean person? For all I know, it could be, at least 
conceivably, that I am the animal thinking falsely that I am a person. If this is so, 
then many of the beliefs I have about myself will turn out to be false, even the 
belief ‘I am a person’ (for human animals are not persons). The epistemic problem 
leads to deep, if not outrages, scepticism, for it not only leaves open the question 
whether I am a person but also suggests that I could not possibly know the 
answer. What can I appeal to in distinguishing the person-thinker from the non-
person thinker? Even thought metaphysically speaking it is true that one of them is 
a person and is numerically identical with me, how do I know? 
 
● The epistemic problem (too many thinkers problem) 
In the coincident case in which two thinking beings, the animal and the 
Lockean person, are thinking the exact same I-thoughts occupying the exact 
same spatial-temporal location, how do I know which one of the thinkers is me? 
 
 Note that this problem carries implications to the broader animalism vs. 
neo-Lockeanism debate. The epistemic problem is a consequence of the too many 
thinkers case as part of the neo-Lockean view, which seems to be highly counter-
intuitive, if not by itself absurd. Unless the neo-Lockean theorist can offer a 
satisfactory explanation, the argument by reductio against neo-Lockeanism is 
motivated. 
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3. Response to the Epistemic Problem: Personal Pronoun 
Revisionism / the Linguistic Solution 
 Noonan’s response to the epistemic problem is based on his proposed 
semantic rule for first-personal pronouns. In this section, I will give an overview of 
his account.  
 Let us begin with the distinction that is fundamental to his response: the 
distinction between thinkers of I-thoughts and objects of first-person reference.  
 
“… what the psychological continuity theorist must do … is reject the original definition of a 
person, substitute for it the notion of the object of self-reference, and insist on a distinction 
between the ‘I’-user and the reference of ‘I’. Then he can say that when a person and a 
human animal coincide the animal can indeed think ‘I’-thoughts, but is not thereby 
constituted a person, for the reference of its ‘I’-thoughts is not itself but the person with 
whom it is sharing those thoughts.” (Noonan 2010b, p. 197, my italic) 
 
“The word ‘person’ as it is used in this debate (and its synonym ‘self’) is merely intended to 
allow a nonindexical formulation of these questions. So, ‘person’ in the philosophical 
debate simply means object of first-person reference.” (Noonan 2010c, p.95) 
 
 The first quote sums up such distinction. It is meant to contrast with what 
Noonan calls “the original definition of a person” which is, presumably, that x is a 
person iff x is a thinker of I-thoughts. Given the neo-Lockean view that all persons 
are Lockean persons / psychological continuers, it follows that while both the 
human animal and the Lockean person are indeed thinkers of the same I-thoughts, 
e.g. that I am sitting, the ‘I’ in the I-thought refers to the Lockean person instead of 
the thinking animal (hereafter, I shall speak of thoughts with the italic that-clause 
form: that I am sitting). In virtue of being a thinker of the thought that I am sitting, 
the thinking animal, according to Noonan, is not thereby constituted to be a 
person16. 
 																																																								
16 So this proposed rule for the reference of personal pronouns serves the interest of the neo-
Lockean theorist. But it is worth reminding that what really rules out human animals, albeit being 
capable of being thinkers of I-thoughts, is that i) the concept of persons is structured around a set 
of necessary and sufficient conditions ii) the transplant intuition we have regarding cases that are 
structurally the same as the prince/cobbler case, e.g. the Brown/Brownson case by Shoemaker 
(1963). See appendix for details.  
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 In the second quote, it indicates Noonan’s conviction that personal 
pronouns such as ‘I’, the word ‘self’, and the word ‘person’ are all referential 
expressions that are on a par regarding their meaning: these are expressions that 
have the same linguistic reference i.e. objects of first-person reference, although 
they differ in terms of some other linguistic aspects, namely, while ‘I’ is an 
indexical sensitive to contexts, ‘person’ is not. Noonan takes this difference as 
trivial in the debate of personal identity17. 
 Return to the epistemic problem the neo-Lockean theorist encounters. The 
quick answer by Noonan is that the question “answers itself”. 
 
“Hence, there is no epistemic worry since the question whether I am a person or an animal 
answers itself, and there is no worry that we must say that there are two persons present, 
since there is a difference between the person and the animal which justifies denying that 
the animal is a person, namely that it is not an object of first-person reference, a self” 
(Noonan 2012, p.317, my italic) 
 
 When x has an I-thought that I am a person, as the idea goes, the ‘I’ in x’s I-
thought refers to the person who thinks the I-thought. Suppose x is a person in the 
neo-Locekan sense. It follows that x’s I-thought that I am a person is about herself. 
Hence, x can know that she is the person who thinks the I-thought (only one of the 
thinkers is a person) in virtue of being both the thinker and the object of the I-
thought that I am a person. On the other hand, although the human animal y that 
coincides with x also knows that I am a person viz. the person who thinks the I-
thought is a person, the same I-thought that y grasps is not about y. Both the 
animal y and the Lockean person x know that I am sitting, while the ‘I’ in the I-
thought refers to the person who is thinking the thought i.e. the Lockean person in 
this case. They both know the same I-thought, but only the Lockean person x is 
thinking of herself.  
 If we take the animal y’s perspective, reporting the animal’s belief, we may 
say that the animal knows that it is a person, while the ‘it’ is an indirect reflexive 																																																								
17 “(1) Persons and only persons are objects of first-person reference. “I take this to be trivially 
analytic. If anything is a person, it is capable of being an object of (its own) first-person reference 
and anything which is capable of being an object of first-person reference is a person.“ (Noonan 
2010c p.93-4) 
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term referring to the Lockean person x, not the animal y itself18. By contrast, the 
Lockean person knows that it (s/he) is a person, while the ‘it (s/he)’ is a direct 
reflexive term because the Locekan person x is the object of the I-thought (for the 
Lockean person is a person). Presented in a non-indexical way, we say both the 
Lockean person x and the thinking animal y know truly the thought that I am a 
person viz. the person-thinker of the I-thought to which the ‘I’ in the I-thought refers 
is a person. No epistemic worry. Let us summarise the idea of this response in 
neutralised terms as follows: 
 
● Response to the epistemic problem 
For the same I-thought, there can be a person-thinker as well as non-person-
thinker of such a thought. When a thinker x has an I-thought, x is thereby 
qualified as a thinker of the I-thought that I am a person, but this alone is not 
sufficient for x to be the object for the reference of the ‘I’ in the thought. 
According to Noonan’s proposal, the ‘I’ in x’s I-thought refers to entities that are 
such that i) x is a person and ii) x is a thinker of the I-thought. If x is a person-
thinker and x is has the thought that I am a person then x is the object for the 
reference of the ‘I’ in such I-thought; whereas if x is not a person-thinker and 
has the same thought, x’s thought that I am a person is not about x, even 
though x is the thinker of it. Nevertheless, both of person-thinker and the 
coincident non-person-thinker know the I-thought that I am a person because 
they both know that the person whose thinking the I-thought is a person (but 
the thought only refers to the person-thinker).  
 
 If this explanation holds, then not only does it rescue neo-Lockeanism from 
reducio ad absurdum19, since it allows the neo-Locekan theorist to avoid the 
radical scepticism posed by the epistemic problem, but also it threatens animalism 																																																								
18 “The animal, on the other hand, does not know of itself that it is a person, since it is not. It does, 
however, know the thought it would express by saying ‘I am a person’. Does it know that it is itself a 
person? Is it correct to say ‘the animal knows that it itself is a person’? Yes: ‘it itself’ is here the 
indirect reflexive. It is not an expression whose reference is the animal. In fact, it does not refer at 
all. ‘The animal knows that it itself is a person’ is a report that the animal knows what it could 
correctly express by saying ‘I am a person’” 2010b, p. 198 
19 In fact it also answers the Incoherence challenge and the personhood problem posed by Olson 
(2002) 
23		
in return: i) ‘we’ refers to persons20; ii) persons are psychological continuers; iii) 
human animals are not psychological continuers; therefore, iv) we are not human 
animals. The last claim is in direct conflict with the animalist’s tenant that we are 
animals.  
 Having said that, Noonan’s proposal is not necessarily incompatible with 
animalism since it is possible to rephrase Noonan’s proposal in neutral terms. The 
animalist can agree with Noonan that the linguistic solution can indeed resolve the 
epistemic problem [fn] This is especially desirable if the animalist accepts that 
animalists also face the epistemic problem due to the corpse problem as 
suggested in Shoemaker (1999a, 1999b)[/fn], but still argues against the built-in 
neo-Lockeanism claim—all persons are psychological continuers. After all, the 
requirement we found in the proposal is just that the objects of first-person 
reference are persons. The proposal by itself doesn’t imply the above neo-
Lockean claim. The animalist could accept the proposal and MULTIPLICITY, but 
argue that persons, contrary to Noonan, are human animals as biological 
continuers. If the discussion goes along this line, we move back to the initial 
disagreement that characterises the debate between animalism and neo-
Lockeanism. The animalist may attempt to explain or explain away the transplant 
intuition as (Snowdon 1991, Olson 1997) did (see appendix for more details), a 
move anticipated and defended by Noonan21.  
 This is not how the discussion actually develops between Olson and 
Noonan. Olson (2002) argues that Noonan’s proposal is not a satisfactory 
response to the epistemic problem. But before we get to the criticisms of Noonan’s 
proposal, I think it is necessary to linger on Noonan’s proposal so as to get down 
to the details.  
																																																								
20 On the assumption that personal pronouns refer to the same objects as the term ‘person’ refers 
to. 
21 “That is, why can quite different kinds of thing with quite different kinds of persistence condition 
not be objects of first-person reference (Noonan 1978: 351)? 
This is a very good question. The only answer, I think, is the transplant intuition, which has to be 
accommodated.” (2010c, p.98) 
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4. More on Personal Pronoun Revisionism 
 In this section, I will focus on Noonan’s further explanation for his personal 
pronoun revisionism as in Noonan (2010b, 2010c, 2012). I shall note ahead that 
the general tension we will see in his proposal is the contention that the thinking 
animal cannot refer to itself when having an I-thought. Let us begin with some of 
Olson’s remarks on Noonan’s proposal. 
 
“The idea is that the epistemic problem arises only if we assume that any being that says 
or thinks 'I' thereby refers to itself. (…) Noonan says it is false. 
 
(…) 'I' doesn't simply refer to whatever utters it. It refers to whatever person utters it. When 
a non-person says 'I', that pronoun refers to the person who shares in that utterance. (…) 
And first person thoughts share their content with the first-person utterances that express 
them. (…) The belief that one is a person and not an animal is guaranteed to be true, no 
matter what being has it.”  
      (Olson 2002, p.8) 
 
 One sharp difference between what Noonan calls the “original definition of 
person” and his revisionism is that the reference of ‘I’ on the former view is the 
thinker of the I-thought, and the reference of ‘I’ on the latter view is the person who 
thinks the I-thought. What is being “revised” here is indicated by the extra 
‘personhood requirement’, and strictly speaking it is not really a revision but a 
further constraint in addition to being the thinker of. On the original view, the 
derived characterisation of the contents of I-thoughts has the attribute of being 
reflexive: if x is a thinker of the I-thought that I am so-and-so, the thought refers to 
x. On Noonan’s view, due to the personhood requirement and neo-Lockeanism, 
contents are not necessarily reflexive in this sense, and in the coincident case it is 
not. For the animal is the thinker of the thought that I am so-and-so but not the 
object of the first person reference of the thought on the neo-Locekean view. 
Noonan remarks that it “leads to the surprising conclusion that there are more 
thinkers than common-sense acknowledges and that some of these are not 
objects of their first-person reference” (Noonan, 2010c, p.95).  
 So, we have a case in which though the thinking animal and the Lockean 
person are both thinkers of the same I-thought, the content of the thought is about 
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the person only—the Lockean person. This is the element in Noonan’s revisionism 
that seems to be difficult to take on board. It is because we usually think the 
contents of I-thoughts are essentially reflexive. This seems to be what we 
understand of and mean by I-utterances. The implication that the non-person-
thinker, though being cognitively identical to the person-thinker, is not referring to 
itself while making I-utterances, but the person-thinker is, seems more than just 
being counter-intuitive. For, the proposal suggests ‘I’ being reflexive is not 
necessary. In the case of the coincident non-person-thinker, it is not. 
 Being aware of this tension Noonan attempts to explain away the counter-
intuitiveness by the appeal to the Fregean approach to contents of thoughts. I shall 
devote the next sub-sections for scrutinising this idea.  
4.1 Initial Analysis 
 We begin with his proposed rule for the reference of ‘I’. 
 
“The rule of reference for ‘I’ is thus not that the reference of ‘I’ is the thinker of the ‘I’-
thought (there is no unique thinker), but that the reference is the person thinking the ‘I’-
thought. No other rule is needed …”  (Noonan 2010b, p.197, my italic) 
 
 The proposed rule of the reference of personal pronouns such as ‘I’ is: the 
person thinking the I-thought. For example, if person A has an I-thought that I am 
sitting and the corresponding I-utterance is “I am sitting” by A, then the ‘I’ in the I-
utterance refers to the person who is thinking the thought that I am sitting, that is, 
A, and the thought that I am sitting is a thought about A.  
 
● Rule for the reference of ‘I’  
x is the reference of ‘I’ iff i) x is the thinker of the I-thought expressed by the I-
utterance, and ii) x is a person 
 
 Applying this proposed rule to the coincident case, we say both the human 
animal and the Lockean person satisfy (i), but only the Lockean person satisfies 
(ii) on the neo-Lockean account. Thus, the reference of ‘I’ is the Lockean person. 
(i) and (ii) are the conditions for an entity x being the reference of a personal 
pronoun. 
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 The following quote tells us how the proposed rule resolves the epistemic 
problem. 
 
“Both the person and the animal can know that their utterance of ‘I am a person’ is true. 
And each understands this sentence, so each knows the proposition it expresses (…). In 
virtue of knowing this, the animal knows, of the person, that it is a person, and the person 
(who, of course, knows no less) knows, of the person, that it is a person. So the person 
knows, of himself, that he is a person (if x knows of x that he is F, then x knows of himself 
that he is F). I know that what I express by ‘I am a person’ is true. Since I understand this 
sentence I also know the proposition thus expressed, and in doing so I know, of myself, 
that I am a person. But no more than this can be required for knowledge de se, of oneself, 
that one is a person.” (Noonan 2010b p.198, my italic) 
 
 The first thing to note is the acknowledgement that understanding an 
utterance/sentence amounts to knowing the proposition it expresses. In the course 
of making an I-utterance ‘I am a person’, both the human animal and the Lockean 
person understand this utterance and thereby they know the proposition it 
expresses. It is the proposition that is said to be the entity being known. More 
precisely, we hold the propositional attitude knowing towards the proposition 
expressed by an I-utterance. It is a relation between a knower and a proposition. It 
implies that Noonan subscribes to a certain theory of propositions when it comes 
to matters of philosophy of language. As we shall see shortly, it is a Fregean 
theory.   
 My second note is that there nevertheless is a difference between the 
animal’s knowing that I am so-and-so and the Lockean person’s knowing that I am 
so-and-so, despite the suggestion that their thoughts have the same contents viz. 
express the same proposition. Let P be the proposition that the I-utterance ‘I am 
so-and-so’ expresses. As Noonan suggests in the quote, there is a sense in which 
the Lockean person’s knowing that P is the same as the animal’s knowing that P 
captured under the gloss “they both know, of the person, that P”. But, most 
importantly, there is another sense in which their knowing that P are somewhat 
different: only the person knows, of herself, that P (and not both but only one of 
them is a person). Regarding this sense, on the neo-Lockean view only the 
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Lockean person who knows, of herself, that P. Stated free of indexicals, we may 
say that the Lockean person knows, of the Lockean person, that P, and the animal 
knows, of the Lockean person, that P. Such difference is marked as knowing de se 
/ de se knowledge: x knows de se that P iff P is about x itself iff the subject of P is 
x. 
4.2 Propositions as Fregean Sense and Reference 
 Propositions are analysed in terms of Fregean thoughts and senses. 
 
“So the question for the first-person pronoun revisionist is not how the animal and person 
can differ in their cognitive capacities, given their coincidence, but why, given their 
numerical distinctness, they are cognitively identical, are entertaining exactly the same 
Fregean thoughts.” (2012, p.317-8, my italic) 
 
“I find it helpful to think of this in Fregean terms, following Geach (1976). The first-person 
pronoun ‘I’ has a constant linguistic meaning but expresses different senses in the mouths 
of different utterers. The sense of ‘I’ as uttered by x is a function of x; it is a different sense 
from that expressed by y if x is a person distinct from the person y. We can speak of the 
ego function which carries any x to the sense ‘I’ has in x ’s mouth. Then, allowing Greek 
letters as variables ranging over senses, we may say that ‘x thinks that it itself is F’ means 
‘for some α, α= ego (x) and x thinks [α is F]’—here the thought that [α is F] is the thought 
you would express in language by attaching the predicate ‘is F’ to a subject term whose 
sense is the mode of presentation α. 
 
So it is true that the animal thinks that it itself is a person. But it is not true that the animal 
thinks of itself that it is a person, since the assumption required for this inference is that in 
all cases ego (x) is a mode of presentation of x, and if x is not a person this is not so; in this 
case, ego (x) is a mode of presentation of the person with whom x shares the first-person 
thought.” (Noonan 2010b, p.198-9) 
 
 There are several important characterisations being laid down in the second 
quote. The most important ones are those related to the sense of ‘I’: i) the word ‘I’ 
expresses different senses relative to “the mouth of the utterer”; ii) a sense is a 
mode of presentation of some x; iii) there is an ego function of a person x to a 
sense of ‘I’; and lastly, iv) the word ‘I’ has constant linguistic meaning. 
 A Fregean thought is a complex of Fregean senses. Consider an I-
utterance ‘I am hungry’ by person A. The ego function “carries person A to a sense 
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of ‘I’ in A’s thought”, and A’s thought consists of such sense of ‘I’ and the sense 
expressed by the predicate ‘…am hungry’. Together, the sense of ‘I’ and the sense 
of ‘… am hungry’ constitute A’s Fregean thought, which is what we have been 
calling ‘I-thought’ described in the form: that I am hungry.  
 Example: suppose there are two persons A and B who both make the same 
utterance ‘I am hungry’. The corresponding Fregean thought that person A has is: 
 
(TxΦ=ego(y) reads T: thought; x: thinker of T; Φ: sense of ‘I’ which is a mode of 
presentation; ego(y): ego function of person y) 
 
● A utters ‘I am hungry’ 
● A thinks a Fregean thought TxΦ=ego(y)  identified by A’s utterance ‘I am 
hungry’ 
● A thinks that TAΦ=ego(y)  = the sense of ‘I’ + the sense of ‘… am   
   hungry’ 
● A thinks that TAΦ=ego(y)  = {the sense of ‘I’ = ego(y)} + {the sense of ‘…  
   am hungry’ = [is hungry]} 
● A thinks that TAΦ=ego(y)  =  the sense of ‘I’ = ego(y) + [is hungry] 
● A thinks that TAΦ=ego(y)  =  the sense of ‘I’ = ego(A) + [is hungry] 
● A thinks that TAα=ego(A)  =  α + [is hungry] 
● A thinks that TAα=ego(A)  =  [α is hungry] 
● A’s Fregean thought    =  TAα=ego(A) 
 
 In the case of person B, although B’s utterance is the same as A’s, but the 
corresponding Fregean thought that B has is different. It is because the sense of ‘I’ 
that constitutes B’s thought differs from the sense of ‘I’ that constitutes A’s thought 
in the object of which it is a mode of presentation. 
 
● B utters ‘I am hungry’ 
● B thinks a Fregean thought TxΦ=ego(y)  identified by B’s utterance ‘I am 
hungry’ 
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● B thinks that TBΦ=ego(y)  =  the sense of ‘I’ + the sense of ‘… am   
    hungry’ 
● B thinks that TBΦ=ego(y)  =  {the sense of ‘I’ = ego(y)} + {the sense of ‘…  
    am hungry’ = [is hungry]} 
● B thinks that TBΦ=ego(y)  = the sense of ‘I’ = ego(y) + [is hungry] 
● B thinks that TBΦ=ego(y)  =  the sense of ‘I’ = ego(B) + [is hungry] 
● B thinks that TBβ=ego(B)  =  β + [is hungry] 
● B thinks that TBβ=ego(B)  =  [β is hungry] 
● B’s Fregean thought    =  TBβ=ego(B) 
 
 Due to different senses as constitutants, it follows that the same I-utterance 
by A and B expresses different Fregean thoughts they have respectively: TAα=ego(A) 
=/= TBβ=ego(B).  
 Note that the argument of the ego function is supposed to be a person x, 
and the value of the ego function would be a sense Φ which is a mode of 
presentation of the very person x. In normal cases in which the utterer of an I-
utterance is presumed to be a person, a one-to-one correspondence is exhibited 
between i) the argument of the ego function, ii) person x, and iii) the object of 
which the sense of ‘I’ Φ is a mode of presentation. In cases like A’s and B’s, we 
witness that the thinker of the Fregean thought, the argument of the ego function, 
and the object of which a sense of ‘I’ is a mode of presentation of are ‘aligned’: 
they are the same person x. Noonan’s distinction between thinker of I-thought and 
objects of first-person reference is thus unnecessary regarding normal cases. It is 
because the thinker of the thought is also the referent of the thought e.g. A is the 
thinker of TAα:ego(A), and the sense of ‘I’ α is a mode of presentation of A. 
 Contrasting the analysis of the coincident case, matters stand differently. 
We would need to work under the following neo-Lockean terms: a) since all 
persons are psychological continuers, only the Lockean person can be the 
argument of the ego function; b) the Lockean person and the thinking animal are 
cognitively identical, so their Fregean thought(s) cannot differ. Due to (a) we can 
expect that the case for the Lockean person is basically the same as the normal 
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cases in which the thinkers are presumed to be persons, but different in the case 
of the coincident animal. 
 
● (HA: human animal, LP: Lockean person) 
● HA utters ‘I am hungry’ 
● HA thinks a Fregean thought TxΦ=ego(y)  identified by HA’s utterance ‘I am 
hungry’ 
● HA thinks that THAΦ=ego(y)  =  the sense of ‘I’ + the sense of ‘… am   
     hungry’ 
● HA thinks that THAΦ=ego(y)  = {the sense of ‘I’ = ego(y)} + {the sense of  
     ‘… am hungry’ = [is hungry]} 
● HA thinks that THAΦ=ego(y)  = the sense of ‘I’ = ego(y) + [is hungry] 
● HA thinks that THAΦ=ego(y)  = the sense of ‘I’ = ego(LP) + [is hungry] 
● HA thinks that THAγ=ego(LP) = γ+ [is hungry] 
● HA thinks that THAγ=ego(LP) = [γ is hungry] 
● HA’s Fregean thought      = THAγ=ego(LP) 
 
 Notice that the ego function takes the Lockean person (LP) instead of the 
thinking animal (HA) as its argument despite the fact that the thinking animal is, 
like the Lockean person, a thinker of the (/its own)  Fregean thought. This is 
because the ego function takes only the person who utters ‘I am hungry’, and neo-
Lockeanism implies that it is the Lockean person (it would be the thinking animal if 
the ego function is free of the personhood requirement and takes whoever utters 
the I-utterance i.e. THAδ=ego(HA) instead of THAγ=ego(LP)). As a result, the value of the 
ego function γ is a sense of ‘I’ that is a mode of presentation of the Lockean 
person. In short, the thinker of the Fregean thought, the argument of the ego 
function, and the object of which a sense of ‘I’ is a mode of presentation are not 
‘aligned’, and the personhood requirement as a substantial element proposed by 
personal pronoun revisionism manifests itself as a condition on the ego function. 
Compare the case for the Lockean person: 
 
● LP utters ‘I am hungry’ 
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● LP thinks a Fregean thought TxΦ=ego(y)  identified by LP’s utterance ‘I am 
hungry’ 
● (…) 
● LP thinks that TLPΦ=ego(y)  = the sense of ‘I’ = ego(LP) + [is hungry] 
● LP thinks that TLPγ=ego(LP) = γ+ [is hungry] 
● LP thinks that TLPγ=ego(LP) = [γ is hungry] 
● LP’s Fregean thought     = TLPγ=ego(LP) 
 
 The correspondence between the thinker of the I-thought, the argument of 
the ego function and the object of which the sense of ‘I’ γ is a mode of 
presentation are exhibited: the same Lockean person LP. What determines the 
same Fregean thought (THAγ=ego(LP) = TLPγ=ego(LP)) of the animal and the Lockean 
person is the same sense of ‘I’ γ. Take the perspective of the thinking animal for 
the moment. Since the sense of ‘I’ γ requires the object of which γ is a mode of 
presentation to be a person, it cannot be a mode of presentation of the thinking 
animal. γ, after all, must be a mode of presentation of some objects. Thanks to the 
personhood requirement proposed by Noonan, it follows that γ “is a mode of 
presentation of the person with whom the thinking animal shares the first-person 
thought”: the Lockean person.  
 If we follow Noonan in analysing propositions as entities expressed by I-
utterances in the above Fregean way, then we should expect that Fregean 
thoughts play the cognitive role that propositions are commonly expected to play in 
a theory of belief. If it can be said that I now have a thought and am ready to 
express what I know by the utterance ‘I am a person’, what I know is the Fregean 
thought identified by such utterance i.e. the proposition, the belief, expressed by 
my utterance ‘I am a person’. Likewise, if I understand someone’s I-utterance ‘I am 
hungry’, what I understand is the Fregean thought expressed by that person’s 
saying ‘I am hungry’. In short, Fregean thoughts are the entities that are said to be 
known and understood from utterances—the contents of I-utterances. The result 
that both the thinking animal and the Lockean person know the same Fregean 
thought so far follows from the neo-Lockean’s commitment that they are 
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cognitively identical: what the Lockean person knows or understands is the same 
as what the thinking animal knows or understands.  
4.3 Fregean Analysis: de se Knowledge 
 On the other hand, Noonan does acknowledge that there is a difference 
between the animal’s knowing that I am so-and-so and the Lockean person’s 
knowing that I am so-and-so: only the Lockean person knows de se that I am so-
and-so. Let the term ‘de se knowledge’ be defined by such difference. In this sub-
section we shall see how de se knowledge is characterised in terms of the current 
Fregean analysis. On de se knowledge, Noonan remarks: 
 
“(…) Since I understand this sentence I also know the proposition thus expressed, and in 
doing so I know, of myself, that I am a person. But no more than this can be required for 
knowledge de se, of oneself, that one is a person. 
 
The animal, on the other hand, does not know of itself that it is a person, since it is not. It 
does, however, know the thought it would express by saying ‘I am a person’. Does it know 
that it is itself a person? Is it correct to say ‘the animal knows that it itself is a person’? Yes: 
‘it itself’ is here the indirect reflexive. It is not an expression whose reference is the animal 
(…) So it is true that the animal thinks that it itself is a person. But it is not true that the 
animal thinks of itself that it is a person, …” (Noonan 2010b p.198-9) 
 
 I interpret the last statement “it is true that the animal thinks that it itself is a 
person. But it is not true that the animal thinks of itself that it is a person” as 
follows: since the Lockean person and the thinking animal have the same Fregean 
thought THAγ=ego(LP) = TLPγ=ego(LP), it entails that there is a same sense of ‘I’ that 
constitutes such Fregean thought—γ. γ is a sense of ‘I’ that is a mode of 
presentation of the person—the Lockean person. Senses determine references, 
and the same sense cannot differ in its reference. The phrase ‘thinking of’ 
indicates whether the reference of x’s thought is about x itself. The sense of ‘I’ that 
constitutes the animal’s Fregean thought is a mode of presentation of the person, 
the Lockean person on Noonan’s view, and thus the animal is not thinking of itself. 
The condition for thinking de se is the following: 
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● De Se Knowledge 
x knows de se that P (thinks of itself) iff the reference of P is x (or the sense of 
‘I’ is a mode of presentation of x) 
 
 This captures Noonan’s characterisation of de se knowledge. As for the 
question: why is the sense of ‘I’ γ that constitutes the animal’s Fregean thought not 
a mode of presentation of the animal? In other words, what determines γ is a 
mode of presentation of the Lockean person but not the animal? This is where 
Noonan’s revisionism joins in, which claims that the rule for the reference of ‘I’ is 
the naïve rule plus the personhood requirement: i) x is the thinker of the I-thought 
& ii) x is a person. This rule dictates the sense of ‘I’ γ must be such that it is a 
mode of presentation of the person who thinks the I-thought. For the sake of 
exposition, we may think of it as a definite description: ‘the person who thinks the 
I-thought’22, and the reference of the thought is the object that satisfies such 
description. So, 
 
(1) LP knows that I am so-and-so 
(1’) HA knows that I am so-and-so 
 
(2) LP knows that the person who thinks the I-thought (sense γ) is so-and-so 
(2’) HA knows that the person who thinks the I-thought (sense γ) is so-and so 
 
(3) LP knows that LP (reference of γ) is so-and-so 
(3’) HA knows that LP (reference of γ) is so-and-so 
 
(4) LP knows de se that P 
(4’) HA knows that P 
 
 How can we account for such difference between LP’s knowing and HA’s 
knowing that P appearing in (4) & (4’)? To maintain coherency, it seems that 																																																								
22 I suppose that the context of the discourse is clear enough to determine which I-thought is “the I-
thought” in question. 
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Noonan must insist that knowing de se that P or not would not make a difference 
in one’s understanding of the proposition. If there is any difference, it must be 
somehow external to one’s understanding of the I-utterance. Or the de se 
qualification of the content P must be an extrinsic property to LP’s cognition23. 
Alternatively, if we speak of the propositional attitude knowing as a relation 
between a knower and a proposition, then one can suggest that knowing de se is 
a property attributed to the relation, not to the proposition as content. What 
prompts suggestions along this line is the neo-Lockean claim that in the too many 
thinkers case, the non-person-thinker and the person-thinker are cognitively the 
same. To account for the difference, we must appeal to something other than 
entities that analysed as ones that are responsible for the cognition of I-utterances. 
4.4 Some Problems Concerning the Fregean Analysis 
 In the Fregean analysis, the contents of I-thoughts are analysed in terms of 
Fregean thoughts. In doing so, we are supposing a theory of propositions: 
propositions are complexes of Fregean senses. Understanding contents in terms 
of Fregean propositions is one way in which we can cash out Noonan’s personal 
pronoun revisionism. In this sub-section, I shall outline some weaknesses specific 
for this Fregean approach to the defence of neo-Lockeanism. 
 The first worry has to deal with the general epistemology that this Fregean 
analysis carries over. x’s believing that P is necessary for x’s knowing that P. So, if 
it can be said that x knows that P, x must believe that P. According to Frege, in 
belief context the objects that stand in the believing relation are thoughts such that 
(i) thoughts are complexes of senses; and (ii) thoughts are bearers of meaning 
and understanding i.e. are responsible for the cognition of language. In other 
words, we gain knowledge via the meaning of the words. This seems to echo 
Dummett’s conception of Frege: Frege replaces epistemology by the philosophy of 
language as the first philosophy24.  
																																																								
23 For example, the property of being a brother of is an extrinsic property for me since the 
obtainment of this property is determined by individuals other than myself: In a world w in which I 
have a sister, I have such property; in a world w* in which I am the only son of my family, I don’t 
have such property, but the me in w and the me in w’ are the same individual. An example of an 
intrinsic property is the property of being fat.  
24 Dummett 1981, p. 669 
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 Admittedly, when it comes to how we can know something about non-
existing objects, explaining our knowledge of objects of this sort in terms of senses 
seems to be compelling. After all, the objects don’t exist (or, as we may suppose, 
the nature of their existence is radically different than that of some everyday 
material objects like tables and apples, which are references in the current 
Fregean analysis). But if persons are indeed certain objects that exist in the world 
and one of them is numerically identical with me, claiming that I can only know 
something about such object via some senses i.e. modes of presentation, the 
same way as I know something about non-existing objects like unicorns and the 
king of France doesn’t seem to be as compelling as the case of non-existing 
objects25. Intuitively, there seems to be a more direct way, perhaps a relation 
between a knower and an object determined by a Fregean sense. But 
epistemology of this sort seems to be ruled out by the Fregean analysis of 
propositions.  
 A more compelling alternative for the epistemology of persons seems to be 
one that is suggested by Russell according to which propositions are analysed in 
terms of objects, properties, and relations, that is, the theory of acquaintance 
(Russell 1912), (1910): when I have a thought that I am hungry, I have a de re 
belief of an object, myself, to which the ‘I’ in the I-thought refers and which I have 
direct acquaintance with. In doing so, senses are not necessary.  
 The second issue is concerned with Frege’s thesis about de se attitudes. 
Frege famously held that the propositions identified by I-utterances i.e. de se 
propositions are private: 
 
“Now everyone is presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is 
presented to no-one else. So, when Dr. Lauben thinks that he has been wounded, he will 
probably take as a basis this primitive way in which he is presented to himself. And only Dr. 
Lauben himself can grasp thoughts determined in this way.”  
(Frege 1956, 298) 
 
																																																								
25 I think explanation of this line would gain more plausibility if one is ready to admit that persons 
are in an important sense non-existing objects, thought, it offenses the common sense that we 
exist. 
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 However, Noonan must reject that de se propositions are private. It is 
because the too many thinkers case implies the sharing of thoughts between the 
temporary coincident thinkers. The thoughts, including I-thoughts, are in this sense 
‘public’, at least public relative to the thinkers who share the thoughts. To preserve 
the coherence of neo-Lockeanism, Noonan must not follow Frege but claim the 
opposite: de se propositions are not private thoughts (they are, at least, locally 
sharable among the thinkers of them). 
 My last worry is a follow-up of the second one. It has to do with the 
characterisation of de se knowledge under the Fregean analysis Noonan 
suggests. His proposal seems to suggest a certain form of externalism on de se 
knowledge. As I explicated previously, one’s knowing de se that P is determined 
by something external to one’s understanding of P. Whether x’s knowing de se or 
not that P makes no internal difference to x’s cognition. 
 The problem is that de se knowledge understood this way seems to fail to 
capture some of the most important characteristics we normally attribute to it. 
Prima facie there seems to be internal differences between one’s knowing de se 
that P and one’s merely knowing that P. That is to say, when x’s thought is a 
thought about herself, x will behave differently and we can only explain this by the 
appeal to some internal differences between x’s merely knowing and knowing de 
se.  
 For example, suppose both Anne and Bongo have the thought that Bongo 
wants to eat ice-cream, a thought that Bongo would express by the utterance ‘I 
want to eat ice-cream’ and Anne ‘He wants to eat ice-cream’. Put in Noonan’s 
terminology both Anne and Bongo are thinking of Bongo via the sense expressed 
by the proper name ‘Bongo’. However, we would expect Bongo to be the one, not 
Anne, who tries to get some ice-cream. The difference between their knowing that 
Bongo wants some ice-cream explains their different behaviours. Bongo seems to 
be motivated by some element in his thought, which is missing in Anne’s. If we ask 
Bongo to explain his behaviour, he would say “It is because I want to eat ice-
cram”, but Anne would say “I am not the one who wants to eat ice-cream. He is.” It 
is hard to see how one can explain the behavioural differences between Bongo 
and Anne without making reference to their internal cognitive lives such as 
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different desires, mental states, beliefs etc., and these have to do with whether the 
subject in Bongo’s thought is himself—whether he knows de se that P or not. This 
is a strong motivation for claiming that there are internal differences corresponding 
to whether one’s thought is about herself. If this is so, in the coincident case we 
should expect that the animal’s knowing that so-and-so and the Lockean person’s 
knowing de se that so-and-so should have certain internal difference as well. But 
this last claim not only contradicts the neo-Lockean’s commitment that the 
Lockean person and the thinking animal are cognitively identical but also is one 
that the resources provided by the Fregean analysis could not explain. 
4.5 Return to the Epistemic Problem 
 I have considered issues that are specific for Noonan’s further explication of 
personal pronoun revisionism in terms of Fregean propositions. But this Fregean 
conception of propositions is just one of the theories of proposition in which the 
defender of neo-Lockeanism can give a full account of his personal pronoun 
revisionism as a response to the epistemic problem, and there exist different 
theories of propositions anyway.  
 What is essential to the solution is that it allows us to resolve the epistemic 
problem: when I ponder the question “which one of the thinkers is me?” or “am I 
the thinking animal or the person?”, the question appears to be genuine only 
because we are supposing a rather naïve rule for the reference of ‘I’, that is, ‘I’ 
refers to the thinker of the thought. In the coincident case, such rule will pick out 
the person-thinker as well as the non-person-thinker, of which posing the 
epistemic problem makes sense. It appears, as the naïve rule suggests, to be 
possible that the ‘me’ / ‘I’ in my thought can refer to the coincident thinking animal 
as well as the Lockean person. But according to Noonan, this naïve rule is not the 
rule for the reference of ‘I’. Instead, the rule for the reference of ‘I’ is a more 
restrictive rule, with the personhood requirement as an extra constraint on the 
object of reference. If this is the case, then there is no epistemic worry that 
whether the ‘I’ / ‘me’ in my thought refers to the person-thinker or the non-person-
thinker since the ‘me’ or ‘I’ in my thought must refer to the person-thinker, and on 
the neo-Lockean account only Lockean persons are persons. The thought that I 
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am a person you have is trivially true: the ‘I’ refers to the person and you are a 
person. The revised rule, if true, resolves the epistemic problem.  
 The substantial claim of this proposal is thus the revised rule, which comes 
with the personhood requirement. That this further restriction on the reference of ‘I’ 
is essential to resolving the epistemic problem is obvious: if we drop this extra 
personhood requirement and employ the naïve rule, then the thinking animal’s I-
thoughts would be thoughts about the animal, and the Lockean person’s thoughts 
about the Lockean person, a result that obviously goes against Noonan’s claim 
that both the animal and the Lockean person are thinking about the person. With 
the revised rule, Noonan can retain the claim that they are cognitively identical and 
the claim that the thought that I am a person is trivially true26. 
 In response, there are two options in general (i) accept the proposal but 
argue against the neo-Lockean claim that persons are psychological continuers; 
(ii) reject the proposal per se27. I shall take the second option and develops a 
challenge to Noonan’s personal pronoun revisionism. But this is not to say that I 
am trying to defend animalism by arguing against neo-Lockeanism since my main 
target is coincident thinkers. It could be, however, but it is not my main interest 
here28. 
5. Against Personal Pronoun Revisionism 
 My general strategy is to employ literature on the problem of de se attitudes 
in order to argue against Noonan’s personal pronoun revisionism. Having said that 
my target is not the specific version that Noonan defends but a more general and 
neutral one: i) it is neutral to neo-Lockeanism and animalism29; ii) it presupposes a 																																																								
26 This point is clearly put in Noonan (2001) “I am a person” is analytic (…) If, as the referential 
ambiguity approach requires, I have my “rivals”, sharing my skin, they will indeed think my 
thoughts. But the thoughts they express using our shared vocal cords in the form “I am . . . ” will in 
no case be thoughts about themselves but rather thoughts about me.” The Fregean analysis is an 
extended defense of the same idea. 
27 Noonan’s personal pronoun revisionism but free of the neo-Lockean claim that all persons are 
psychological continuers 
28 It could be, if what the animalist opposes to neo-Lockeanism is the claim that there are 
coincident person- and non-person-thinkers temporarily occupying the same temporal-spatial 
location and being capable of contemplating exact same I-thoughts. 
29 Again, the personhood requirement by itself doesn’t entail a theory of personal identity. If it turns 
out that persons are psychological continuers, then only the Lockean person can be said to know 
39		
theory of propositions but doesn’t commit to any particular view on the nature of 
propositions30. 
 In the discussion of personal pronoun revisionism, the neo-Lockean 
theorists’ claim that the coincident thinking animal and the Lockean person are 
cognitively identical, is of special importance, for it poses a general constraint on 
the contents of their thoughts. Hence, if we are to say that there is a difference 
between their I-thoughts, such a difference cannot be explained by the appeal to 
different contents in their thoughts. However this creates the tension I briefly 
covered by the Anne/Bongo example in Section 4.4. 
 Noonan himself is aware of the discomfort that goes with his explanation31. 
We normally think that the contents of your I-thoughts and those of mine must be 
somehow different: x’s I-thoughts are ones about x, and y’s I-thoughts about y. 
How can x’s thought that I am so-and-so be a thought about someone else other 
than x itself? It seems that x in virtue of being a thinker of an I-thought is sufficient 
for x to be the reference of the I-thought, and thereby x thinks de se that I am so-
and-so. However, according to personal pronoun revisionism, this intuitive 
correspondence between being a thinker of an I-thought and being able to think de 
se is not necessarily accurate. The thinking animal in the too many thinkers case 
is a counter-example according to the neo-Lockean theorist. 
 My argument against personal pronoun revisionism expands precisely upon 
this discomfort. The worry is not (just) that it goes against our intuition regarding 
the correspondence between thinkers of I-thoughts and being able to think de se, 
but Noonan’s acknowledgement that the difference between thinking de se that P 
and thinking that P is not a difference in content. Intuitively, such de se 
qualification should be one that is of the content, not merely one of the relation 
between the knower and the content that comes extrinsically to one’s grasp of the 																																																																																																																																																																								
de se that I am so-and-so since the Locekan person is the reference of ‘I’. The same goes for 
theories of the biological approach: if persons are biological continuers, then only the thinking 
animal can be said to know de se that I am so-and-so since the thinking animal is the reference of 
‘I’. It all comes down to the question what persons, fundamentally speaking, are. 
30 Propositions can thus be Fregean propositions, Russellian propositions or possible worlds 
31 “Discomfort may remain. According to my version of the neo-Lockean account, it is not possible 
for something that is not a psychological continuer to be an object of its own first-person thoughts, 
no matter how sophisticated its thoughts are” (Noonan 2010c, p.97) The same goes for the 
animalist who accepts Noonan’s proposal but rejects the neo-Lockean claim that persons are 
psychological continuers. 
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content (as it is suggested in Noonan’s Fregean characterisation). As for the 
question why Noonan could not embrace the claim that the person-thinker and 
non-person-thinker have de se thoughts, the answer is straightforward: i) that the 
coincident thinking animal and the Lockean person are cognitively identical, must 
be accommodated and ii) the same Fregean sense cannot differ in its reference 
(but not vice versa). 
 In this section, I will attempt to argue that i) both thinkers are capable of 
having de se I-thoughts, and ii) the contents of their de se I-thoughts are different. 
Ultimately, I claim that we have enough motivation for rejecting Noonan’s neo-
Lockeanism. 
5.1 Setting the Scene 
 In this sub-section, I shall outline and fix the meanings of some relevant 
terms, adopting the labels which will provide easy reference. I shall call the rule 
advocated by Noonan as ‘revised rule for first-person reference’ (RR) and the 
more intuitive rule as ‘naïve rule for first-person reference’ (NR). 
 
● Revised rule for first-person reference (RR) 
x is the reference of ‘I’ iff (i) x is a person; (ii) x thinks an I-thought identified by 
the I-utterance ‘I am so-and-so’ 
 
● Naïve rule for first-person reference (NR) 
x is the reference of ‘I’ iff x is a thinker of an I-thought identified by the I-
utterance ‘I am so-and-so’ 
 
 I will speak of propositions and contents interchangeably. In general, I take 
propositions as the bearers of truth-values and cognitive significance of 
utterances. They are the entities that are expressed by the utterances. The term 
‘content’ in my use is thus an umbrella-term encompassing Fregean propositions, 
Russellian propositions, possible worlds etc.. It is the general theory of 
propositions with which my main argument is concerned. 
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 Since the sort of propositions that will be occupying our attention are the 
contents of our I-thoughts that correspond to I-utterances in particular, let us label 
them as ‘indexical beliefs’. 
 
● Indexical beliefs 
Indexical beliefs are the kind of contents that correspond to indexicalised 
utterances i.e. I-utterances, which take the form ‘I am so-and-so’. 
 
 I-utterances are characterised as utterances that contain the first-person 
pronoun ‘I’ and express propositions. At this moment I remain neutral about 
whether indexical beliefs are essentially indexicalised. This will be discussed later. 
 We can hold different propositional attitudes towards the proposition 
expressed by an utterance, and each one of them is characterised according to 
the word we used in making such belief reports. For example, if the belief report is 
‘I know that Anne has had ice-cream today’, the propositional attitude is 
characterised by the word ‘know’ in my report, and is a relation between me and 
the proposition expressed in the that-clause in the attitude word i.e. the proposition 
identified by the that-clause ‘that Anne has had ice-cream today’. Such relation is 
thus a knowing relation. There are other relations are, for instance, believing, 
thinking, desiring etc.  
 
● Knowing as a propositional attitude 
A holds the propositional attitude knowing towards her indexical belief iff (i) 
there is a knowing relation held between an agent x and a proposition P; (ii) 
x=A; (iii) P = an indexical belief identified by an I-utterance  
 
 In the coincident case, the animal and the Lockean person are said to be 
cognitively identical. This entails that the thinking animal and the Lockean person 
would (i) have the same indexical belief, and (ii) hold the same propositional 
attitude towards that belief.  
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● Cognitively identical (CI) 
The Lockean person and the coinciding thinking animal are cognitively identical 
iff they can grasp the same contents when understanding I-utterances, and 
hold the same propositional attitude towards them. 
 
 Since CI will play an important role in my argument, I shall explain a bit 
more about the notion of CI I will be discussing. It is a materialist notion. When 
Noonan tries to explain why the animal cannot refer to itself like the Lockean 
person, he makes the point with reference to materialism. 
 
“To the question ‘Why is the animal not thinking of itself in the first-person way given that 
the coincident person is?’, (…) from the materialist viewpoint shared by the animalist and 
the neo-Lockean it is incomprehensible that things like the coincident person and animal, 
which are microphysically indistinguishable throughout the relevant period (differing only in 
irrelevant far off past or future respects), could be cognitively distinct, could be thinking 
about different things or thinking of them in different ways; the mystery would be if they 
did.”       
     (Noonan 2012, p. 318) 
 
 The appeal to identical material constitution explains why the Lockean 
person and the thinking animal must have the same contents in their thoughts 
throughout the relevant coinciding period. This will be the notion of CI I take, which 
is agreed by both Olson and Noonan. 
 Lastly, we have the notion of de se attitude.  
 
● De Se attitudes (DSA) 
x holds a de se attitude A towards a proposition P iff (i) there is a relation 
characterised by attitude A held between x and a proposition P, (ii) P is 
identified by an I-utterance, and (iii) P is about x itself. 
 
 Let us focus on (iii) for the moment. Depending on one’s view on 
propositions, the statement “P is about x” can have quite different interpretations. 
According to the Fregean view we have seen in Section 5, a proposition is a 
complexes of Fregean senses i.e. a thought. A sense is a mode of presentation of 
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an object that can be understood as a set of descriptive conditions. So the 
referent, as an object of which the sense of ‘I’ is a mode of presentation, is the 
entity in (iii) that determines whether P is about x. On the Russellian view, by 
contrast, a proposition is constituted by objects and properties (and relations). “P 
is about x” means that there is a relation between x and proposition P such that 
the subject that constitutes proposition P is x (not merely a mode of presentation 
of x). DSA as such is by no means a definition of de se attitudes but a first 
approximation. 
5.2 The Argument 
 The crucial element in my argument is related to the general discussion of 
the problem arises from de se attitudes, originally called “the problem of the 
essential indexical” in Perry (1979).  
 The gist of my main argument is the following: mainly due to his adherence 
to CI32, Noonan’s proposal also suffers from the problem of de se attitudes in 
general discussed in the literature. In addition, according to the received view 
largely motivated by that problem, both the animal’s thinking that P and the 
Lockean person’s thinking that P are, contrary to Noonan’s account, thinking de 
se. It follows that their indexical beliefs are also different in content, for they are 
about different things. Hence, they are not cognitively identical thinkers, which 
leads to the refutation of neo-Lockeanism on Noonan’s own terms.  
 The structure of my main argument is as follows: 
 
● The argument against the revised rule of the reference of ‘I’ (RR) 
1. If RR is the rule for the reference of ‘I’, then only one of the thinkers in the 
coincident case who satisfies the personhood requirement by RR is thinking 
de se that P 
2. According to the received view on de se attitudes, RR is not the rule for the 
reference of ‘I’, but NR is. 
3. According to NR, both thinkers are thinking de se that P. 
 																																																								
32 I take Noonan’s Fregean analysis and the related characterisation of de se thoughts are mainly 
prompted by CI. 
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 RR is the key to resolving the epistemic problem. If it turns out, as the 
argument shows, that we have independent reason for favouring NR over RR, the 
problem returns: for all I know, I am able to think de se that I am a person. 
However according to the received review, the thinking animal and the Lockean 
person are both able to do so. How do I know which one of them is me? (In 
comparison, there would be only one of them who is able to think de se according 
to RR). By NR, ‘I’ can refer to the person-thinker as well as the non-person-thinker. 
For all I know, I can be either one of them, and my utterance ‘I am a person’ is true 
if I am the person-thinker; false otherwise. Given CI and the claim that both of 
them are capable of thinking de se how can I know which one of them is me? How 
can I individuate one of them as the referent of my I-utterance? The first argument, 
then, if successful, leads to the return of the epistemic problem. 
 Building on top of the first argument, here is the second argument. 
 
● The argument against CI 
1. Suppose CI is true 
2. It follows from CI that the indexical beliefs that the Lockean person and the 
thinking animal have must be the same in content 
3. According to the received view, both of them are thinking de se that P 
4. Given (3) and the notion of de se content the indexical beliefs that the 
Lockean person has must be different than the indexical beliefs that the 
thinking animal has in content 
5. (4) contradicts (2) 
6. Therefore, CI is false 
 
 Premise (3) is just the conclusion of the first argument. What is new is the 
notion of ‘de se content’ (a notion substantiated by the received view on de se 
attitudes) premise (4) appeals to. The conclusion of the second argument is just 
one step away from the refutation of Noonan’s neo-Lockeanism: if the contents of 
their de se thoughts are indeed different, then how can it be said that they are 
cognitively identical? If one is to give up CI, the acceptance of the too many 
thinkers case is not motivated, at least from a materialist point of view: how can 
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two temporally coincident thinkers composed of exact same material matters differ 
in their thoughts? One possible way to defend the position is to bite the bullet: one 
may endorse that they are indeed thinking about different things, but argues for 
another sense of CI:  
 
● Cognitively parallel (CP) 
The thinking animal has its own stream of thoughts, and so does the Lockean 
person while having indexical beliefs. But, these two streams of thoughts, at 
least in the case of indexical beliefs, are private to their owners in the sense 
that only the thinker who thinks de se that P can entertain the indexical belief.  
 
 CP has its roots in Frege’s view on private thoughts. The reason for 
introducing CP may be to allow the neo-Lockean theorist to maintain something 
like CI and the too many thinkers case coherently. The notion of private 
accessibility of one’s indexical beliefs doesn’t seem to be obviously absurd, if not 
defensible, and they can still share non-first-person thoughts. CP allows us to 
resolve the epistemic problem in the following way: The thought that I am a person 
I have is de se and true. In the coincident case, the person-thinker’s private 
thought that I am a person is de se and true; the non-person thinker’s private 
thought that I am a person is also de se but not true since the non-person thinker 
is not a person. We can individuate non-person-thinker from person-thinker 
according to the truth and falsity of the propositions. But if one is to maintain CI, it 
is still difficult to see how one can know that she is the one thinking truly that she is 
a person. After all, by SI, the truth and falsity of the contents will give one the 
same motivation for behaviour and understanding of the contents. 
 There is a more pressing issue with CP, that is, how can we make sense of 
CP? The appeal to dualist ontology may do the trick. However, this is not an option 
for Noonan who endorses a materialist ontology33, and I wonder how much this 
can help the neo-Lockean theorist in the face of the epistemic problem. Therefore, 																																																								
33 “…from the materialist viewpoint shared by the animalist and the neo-Lockean it is 
incomprehensible that things like the coincident person and animal, which are microphysically 
indistinguishable throughout the relevant period (differing only in irrelevant far off past or future 
respects), could be cognitively distinct, could be thinking about different things or thinking of them 
in different ways; the mystery would be if they did.” (Noonan 2012, p. 318) 
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I conclude that if the falsehood of CI is established, and we have a strong 
motivation for abandoning the materialist version of neo-Lockeanism (if not the 
dualist version altogether).  
 I now turn to the presentation of the received view on de se attitudes on 
which my arguments depend. Since the received view is characterised by 
problems, we shall take a little detour before we get to the view on de se attitudes.  
5.3 The Received View on De Se Attitudes 
 The so-called received view on de se attitudes is one that corresponds to 
certain problems risen from de se attitudes. So regarding a received view, there is 
also a ‘received’ problem on de se attitudes. Perry (1979) presents such a 
problem, calling it ‘the problem of the essential indexical’. Ninan (2015) notes: “the 
idea that de se attitudes pose a challenge to theories of attitudes is now the 
received view”. A little later she adds: “the literature on these topics has been less 
than completely clear on just what that problem is supposed to be” (p.1). Getting 
clear what the problem of de se attitudes really is is not my task in this thesis. For 
the sake of my argumentation, I am concerned with the claim that Noonan’s 
account leads to the same problem that the received view on de se attitudes is 
after.  
 I will outline two ‘received’ problems on de se attitudes, calling them 
repectively ‘the problem of the essential indexical’ and ‘the problem of de se 
attitudes’34.The former leads to the claim that indexicals are essential, supporting 
premise (2) of the first argument; the latter leads to a substantial account of de se 
content, which is a notion employed in premise (4) of the second argument.  
 We shall begin with the doctrine of propositions since it is the target of the 
two problems. To better capture the point, I employ the expanded version of 
Perry’s original presentation of the doctrine (1979, p.5-6) by Ninan (2015)35: 
 
● Three tenants of the doctrine of propositions 																																																								
34 I call them as two problems because they are illustrated by two different examples: the messy 
shopper case and the bear attack case. I think a full account on de se attitudes will show that these 
are just but one problem. 
35 Another advantage of employing Ninan’s version is that it fits better with my use of the word 
‘content’. Perry uses the word ‘belief’ instead e.g. “The first is that belief is a relation between a 
subject and an object, the latter being denoted, in a canonical belief report, by a that-clause.“ (p.6) 
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“(1) Two-Place Relation 
An attitude relation (believing, desiring, etc.) is a two-place relation between an agent and 
a content. 
An attitude (type) like the belief that snow is white is a mental state that consists in having 
a certain relational property, i.e. the property of standing in the relation of believing to the 
content that snow is white. 
 
(2) Frege's Constraint 
Contents are assigned to attitudes in a manner that accommodates Frege cases. So if a 
rational agent could have a belief he could express by saying, “Hesperus is bright" without 
having a belief he could express by saying, “Phosphorus is bright," these two beliefs have 
different contents. 
 
(3) Absoluteness 
The contents of attitudes are absolute, i.e. contents do not vary in truth value across 
individuals or times.” 
       (Ninan, 2015, p.7) 
 
● Two expansions 
(4) Agreement 
Agreement is a two-place relation between a group of individuals and a content. 
A group of individuals stands in the agreement relation to a content p iff all the members of 
the group believe p. 
Let Bxp and Byq be token beliefs belonging to x and y respectively. Then x and y agree on 
something in virtue of x's having token belief Bxp and y's having token belief Byq iff p = q. 
 
Let Dxp and Dyq be token desires belonging to x and y respectively. Then x and y agree 
on how they'd like things to be (in one respect) in virtue of x's having token desire Dxp and 
y's have token desire Dyq iff p = q. 
 
(5) Explanation 
Suppose the fact that x performed action α is explained by the fact that 
x has beliefs Bxp1,…,Bxpn and desires Dxq1,…,Dxqk. 
Then, if y has beliefs Byp1,…,Bypn and desires Dyq1,…,Dyqk , then, other things being 
equal, y will also perform α. 
 
      (Ninan 2015, p. 15-7) 
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 Our first problem, the problem of the essential indexical, has to do with 
tenant (3) ABSOLUTENESS and EXPLANATION, illustrated in Perry’s messy 
shopper case: 
 
● Messy shopper case 
“I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing my cart down the aisle on 
one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with the torn 
sack to tell him he was making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail became 
thicker. But I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I was the shopper I was 
trying to catch.” 
 
(Perry 1979, p.1) 
 
 In such a case, we may assume that there is a belief, B, that Perry came to 
believe and led him change his behaviour from looking down at the floor to 
straightening up and checking his own cart. B is the crucial belief that leads Perry 
to change his behaviour and is identified by his utterance ‘I am making a mess’, 
that is, the belief that I am making a mess. However, the belief that I am making a 
mess identified by the utterance ‘I am making a mess’ is not true or false 
absolutely: “had another shopper said it when I did, he would have been wrong. 
So the sentence by which I identify what I came to believe doesn't identify, by 
itself, a proposition.” (p.6-7). The proponent of the doctrine of propositions will 
need to replace ‘I’ with something that fits Perry the shopper alone and, in 
accordance with tenant (3), the semantic value of the resultant sentence by such 
replacement should not vary relative to different speakers. The replacement of ‘I’ is 
thus “a missing conceptual ingredient: a sense for which I am the reference, or a 
complex of properties I alone have, or a singular term that refers to no one but me” 
(p.7). 
 
● Conceptual ingredient 
Replacement: ‘I’ / ‘α’ 
Utterance: ‘I am making a mess’ <-> ‘α is making a mess’ 
Belief report: that I am making a mess <-> that α is making a mess 
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 Replacing the indexical ‘I’ with α as a missing conceptual ingredient the 
resultant utterance ‘α is making a mess’ should identify a proposition that Perry in 
the messy shopper case believes. Let us consider two obvious candidates for α: 
the proper name ‘John Perry’ and the definite description ‘the bearded philosopher 
in a Safeway store west of the Mississippi’. 
 
● Proper name 
Utterance: ‘John Perry is making a mess’ 
Belief report: I (Perry) believe that John Perry is making a mess 
 
● Definite description 
Utterance:  ‘The bearded philosopher in a Safeway store west of the  
  Mississippi is making a mess’ 
Belief report: I (Perry) believe that the bearded philosopher in a   
  Safeway store west of the Mississippi is making a mess 
 
 The problem is that the beliefs, the propositions, rendered by such 
replacements, don’t seem to identify the crucial belief B that leads Perry to change 
his behaviour. For they differ in their explanatory power for the causes of 
behaviours. For example, Perry could believe that that John Perry is making a 
mess without changing his behaviour because he might forget his own name. He 
would, however, if we supplement the following belief that I am John Perry, but it 
brings in the indexical again. The same goes in the case of define definition. By 
EXPLANATION, the resultant beliefs rendered by the above replacements don’t 
have the same content that B is supposed to have, unless we are willing to 
supplement a further belief that I am α. Therefore, we have a case that the 
indexical element in B is essential in the sense that it is irreplaceable in our belief 
reports, a view on de se attitudes that corresponds to the problem of the essential 
indexical. 
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 The second problem, the problem of de se attitudes, has to deal with 
ARGEEMENT and EXPLANATION, which is illustrated in the bear attack case by 
Perry (1977): 
 
● Bear attack case 
“…imagine that you and I are walking in the woods when a bear begins to chase me. Now 
suppose that you and I agree on all of the relevant facts of the case, and we also agree on 
how we'd like the situation to turn out. For example, suppose that we agree that I'm being 
chased a bear. That is, suppose I believe de se that I'm being chased by a bear and that 
you believe de te that I am being chased by a bear, i.e. you have a belief you could 
express to me by saying, “You are being chased by a bear." Now if, as I am assuming, we 
count as agreeing that I am being chased by a bear in virtue of my having this de se belief 
and your having the corresponding de te belief, then it would seem to follow from 
AGREEMENT that these beliefs have the same content. So if we let p1 be the content of 
my de se belief, p1 is also the content of your de te belief. Letting ‘m’ denote me and ‘y’ 
you, this means that I have a token belief Bmp1 and you have a token belief Byp1. ” 
 
    (Ninan 2015, p.16-7)36 
 
 The problem is that AGREEMENT and EXPLANATION yield incompatible 
results. The example in the quote shows that by AGREEMENT my token belief 
Bmp1 should have the same content as your token belief Byp1. Putting it in another 
way, you agree with me on the sentence ‘I am being chased by a bear’ uttered by 
me. The content identified by ‘I am being chased by a bear’ is the belief that I am 
being chased by a bear. In virtue of agreeing with me, you believe that that I am 
being chased by a bear, a belief you would normally express by the utterance ‘you 
are being chased by a bear’. Now, suppose further that the belief that I am being 
chased by a bear leads to the behaviour curling into a ball. By EXPLANATION 
both you and I should perform the same behaviour curling into a ball since we 
have, by agreeing with my utterance “I am being traced by a bear”, the belief that 
that I am being chased by a bear. But this is wrong. I am the only one who is being 
chased by the bear and should be the one who curls into a ball to survive the 
																																																								
36 The case is originally from Perry (1977, p.23) 
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attack. You as a clear-minded and good-hearted person should run away and call 
for help.  
 One way to look at it is that ‘I am being chased by a bear’ uttered by me 
and ‘You are being chased by a bear’ uttered by you don’t identify the same de se 
belief that I am being chased by a bear we thought they did initially. You agreeing 
with my utterance doesn’t follow that you and I have the same contents in our 
beliefs. This line of thinking suggests us to retain EXPLANATION instead of 
AGREEMENT. The proposition I come to believe is that I am being chased by a 
bear—a de se belief; a different proposition you come to believe is that you are 
being chased by a bear—a de te belief (compare previously we said that your 
belief is also the belief that that I am being chased by a bear—an apparently de se 
belief. The problem of de se attitudes illustrated by the bear attack case brings us 
to a more substantial notion of de se content. 
 
● De Se Content 
“(1) If x’s thinking de se that p would lead to the behaviour b, and y’s thinking de se that q 
would not lead to the behaviour b, then the token belief p that x has is different than the token 
belief q that y has in content 
 
(2) If x’s token de se belief p is such that it would lead to behaviour b, and the token belief q 
that y has is the same in content with p (p = q), then y’s token belief q is a de se belief that 
would lead to behaviour b.“ 
        Ninan (2015, p.27-8) 
 
 So here we have two problems concerning de se attitudes. They are 
problems for the expanded doctrine of propositions as such. Now I shall argue that 
they are also problems for Noonan’s personal pronoun revisionism by showing 
that he is committed to the relevant tenants that give rise to the two problems, the 
problem of the essential indexical and the problem of de se attitudes.  
 The problem of the essential indexical has to do with ABSOLUTENESS and 
EXPLANATION. We said that the utterance ‘I am making a mess’ doesn’t identify 
a proposition because it is not true or false absolutely. By ABSOLUTENESS the 
proposition identified by the I-utterance must not vary its truth-value relative to 
different utterers. The resultant sentence ‘John Perry is making a mess’ with the ‘I’ 
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replaced by a proper name is a candidate because its truth-value doesn’t vary 
relatively. Due to CI, Noonan cannot allow an I-utterance to differ its content 
relative to the coincident thinkers. In other words, ‘I am so-and-so’ by the thinking 
animal and ‘I am so-and-so’ by the Lockean person must express the same 
content. RR (understood as descriptive conditions) plays the role that proper 
names play in the example. The content expressed by the two coincident thinkers 
is identified by the sentence ‘the person who thinks the I-thought is so-and-so’. 
Therefore, it is clear that Noonan is committed to a special version of 
ABSOLUTENESS that involves person- and non-person-thinkers. 
 As for the second problem, the problem of de se attitudes, which is 
concerned with AGREEMENT and EXPLANATION, we have something quite 
similar. Due to his acceptance of the too many thinkers case and CI, Noonan is 
committed to saying the Lockean person’s and the thinking animal’s thoughts are 
the same in content. His commitment to materialism rules out the possibility that 
the contents in the two coincident thinkers thinking could differ, which in turn 
grounds the claim that they are thinking the same set of token beliefs. This 
commits him to a more trivial version of AGREEMENT: the person-thinker and 
non-person-thinker agree on something in virtue of the person-thinker’s belief is 
numerically identical with the non-person-thinker’s (compare AGREEMENT 
defined by the phrase “…in virtue of x's having token belief Bxp and y's having 
token belief Byq iff p = q”, which suggests two numerically distinct but qualitatively 
identical token beliefs.)37 
 The problem of the essential indexical and the problem of de se attitudes 
are also problems for Noonan’s account. In what follows, I will take for granted the 
received view and show how it is in conflict with Noonan’s personal pronoun 
revisionism characterised by RR and CI.  
																																																								37	Strictly speaking, one may consider that it is something other than AGREEMENT since we don’t 
have two token beliefs agreed in the coincident case. But I think, with some reservation, that 
AGREEMENT is still applicable because what explains A agrees with B is such that A and B have 
the same belief, and I think in the coincident case it is correct to describe the non-person-thinker 
and the person-thinker “have the same belief”. So what explains AGREEMENT will also explain 
this special version of AGREEMENT. It may be said that the phenomenon of agreement does not 
exist in the coincident case, but what explain this more authentic phenomenon of agreement 
should also explain the phenomenon, whatever it may be, of the coincident case. 
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5.4 Defending The Argument Against RR 
 As the problem of the essential indexical suggests, in the coincident case 
the I-utterance ‘I am a person’ by itself doesn’t identify a proposition since it is not 
true or false absolutely: true if it is uttered by the person-thinker; false if uttered by 
the non-person-thinker. RR understood as a descriptive condition plays the role 
that the definite description that uniquely picks out Perry in the messy shopper 
case plays. With the indexical replaced, the resultant sentence ‘The person who 
thinks the I-thought is a person’ is now true or false simpliciter (trivially true in fact). 
Drawing on the result we achieved from the messy shopper case, such 
replacement would no longer preserve the explanatory force that the indexical 
belief has. By EXPLANATION, they don’t identify the same proposition. We cannot 
replace ‘I’ with ‘the person who thinks the I-thought’ as suggested by RR.  
 On the other hand, NR understood as the following descriptive condition: 
the thinker of the I-thought can preserve the explanatory force that the indexical 
beliefs have. What I am suggesting is that in general ‘I am so-and-so’ and ‘The 
thinker of the I-thought is so-and-so’38 identify the same proposition, expressing 
the same content. Note that this is not the same as replacing by some definite 
description. The difference is that the definite description that can play the role of 
being a missing conceptual ingredient is supposed to be absolute, meaning that its 
semantic value will not change relative to the speaker or the thinker. But the 
descriptive condition by NR is different. The description ‘the thinker of the I-
thought’ doesn’t uniquely single out a reference. In the coincident case, it is not, 
for there is no unique thinker of the I-thought. Hence, given the essentiality of 
indexicals shown by the messy shopper case, NR is more preferable than RR as 
the rule of the reference of ‘I’. If this is so, then in having the belief that I am a so-
and-so both thinkers are qualified as thinking de se since both are thinking of 
themselves respectively. As the first argument goes, the epistemic problem 
returns. 
5.5 Defending the Argument Against CI 
 With the conclusion of the first argument established, we can now claim, 
contrary to Noonan, that both the thinking animal and the Lockean person think de 																																																								
38 Or something alike, for instance, ‘The speaker of…’, ‘The agent of …’, ‘The believer of …’ etc.. 
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se that P when having an I-thought viz. their thoughts are about themselves 
respectively. What we need to show in order to defend the second argument is 
that the Lockean person’s de se belief and the animal’s de se belief have different 
contents. Drawing on De Se Content followed from the bear attack case, I shall 
now attempt to show this. 
 The second argument begins with the premise that CI is true. As we saw 
from the previous discussion, this is the general constraint on Noonan’s account 
that leads to the development of personal pronoun revisionism, characterized by 
the revised rule RR and the claim that only the person-thinker, the Lockean person 
on neo-Lockeanism, is capable of thinking de se when having an I-thought39. In 
short, the coincident thinkers are both thinking truly about the person-thinker. But 
this result is in tension with the received view on de se attitudes followed from the 
bear attack case.  
 Consider the I-utterance ‘I am hungry’ and the corresponding belief that I 
am hungry, and suppose that the behaviour buy ice-cream will be caused by such 
belief. When the person-thinker says “I am hungry”, both the non-person-thinker 
and the person-thinker have the belief identified by the utterance—the belief that I 
am hungry.  
 The person-thinker’s de se belief that I am hungry will lead to the behaviour 
buy ice-cream. What about the non-person-thinker? By CI, we should expect that 
the non-person-thinker would have the some content in its beliefs, a situation that 
is similar to the bear attack case in which you and I both agree that I am being 
attacked by a bear. If the person-thinker’s de se belief can motivate the behaviour 
buy ice-cream, we should expect the same for the non-person-thinker. Then, 
according to the second principle of De Se Content, the non-person-thinker’s belief 
is also a de se belief. However, this last claim is in contradiction with Noonan’s 
claim that only the person-thinker, the Lockean person, is capable of having de se 
beliefs. By reductio, as the second argument goes, we have a false assumption. 
RR and the claim that only the person-thinker is capable of thinking de se follow 
from CI. Therefore, CI is the false assumption. 
																																																								
39 Noonan 2010b, p.198 
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5.6 Possible Objections  
 In this subsection I wish to consider three possible objections to my main 
argument.  
 Objection: The discussion of personal identity need not be framed with 
personal pronouns. The arguments from de se attitudes are not applicable to the 
discussion or only have a limited application to one particular framing of the 
discussion.  
 Reply: I agree that there exist indexical as well as non-indexical ways of 
framing the discussion of personal identity. So, we could side step the arguments 
from de se attitudes. 
 However, this is not an objection on Noonan’s behalf, who thinks that i) the 
term ‘person’ means the same as personal pronouns such as ‘I’ and ‘you’40 ii) the 
formulation with personal pronouns is primitive41. Given (i) the meaning of 
personal pronouns must reconcile the meaning of the term ‘person’; given (ii) the 
meaning of personal pronouns is more primitive. For those who endorse (i) and 
(ii), considerations from de se attitudes apply. 
 Objection: The application of the problems of de se attitudes to the 
coincident case is not appropriate. It is because there is a fundamental difference 
between the coincident case and the cases considered as ones that give rise to 
the problem of de se attitudes that is being dismissed: not all of the thinkers but 
only one of them is a person in the coincident case. As for the cases that reveal 
the problems of de se attitudes e.g. the messy shopper case, the bear attack case, 
these are cases such that the thinkers involved are presumed to be persons. The 
view that indexical beliefs are essentially indexical, which suggests NR as 
opposed to RR, seems true insofar as we are considering cases of the latter sort. 
The scope of the received view on de se attitudes only concerns persons. Indeed, 
in the coincident case the non-person thinker’s indexical beliefs must, after all, 
about something. RR is introduced especially for determining the reference of the 
																																																								
40 Noonan 2010c, p.96 
41 “The debate to which the neo-Lockean intends to contribute is about two questions: ‘What am I 
(fundamentally)?’ and ‘What are my persistence conditions?’ The primary formulation of these 
questions is first-personal.” (p.96) 
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indexical beliefs of non-person-thinkers. RR and NR apply to different sort of 
cases. 
 Reply: This objection fails. The difference, no doubt, is present, but it is 
irrelevant, unless one can show that being a person or not is relevant to a thinker’s 
cognition of I-utterances. For example, it may be argued that persons must be able 
to think in a more sophisticated way than non-persons. If only the Lockean person 
is a person, it follows that the thinking animal must be a less competent thinker. 
NR applies only to thinkers whose capacity in this regard is on a par with persons’. 
 However, this line of defending is blocked by the neo-Lockean’s 
commitment to CI: if the animal lacks certain capacity e.g. the capacity of having 
de se thoughts, so does the Lockean person, and vice versa; if the Lockean 
person has this capacity, so does the animal, and vice versa. The fact that one of 
the thinkers is a person and the non-person-thinker is cognitively identical with the 
person-thinker during the coincident period grants the applicability of the 
considerations for de se attitudes to the coincident case. 
 Objection: Various authors have written about the special problem 
concerning de se attitudes. Perhaps there exists some way in which we can 
accommodate the problems of de se attitudes without conflicting Noonan’s 
account.  
 Reply: I consider the suggestions made by Perry (1979), namely i) 
relativised propositions, ii) limited accessibility, and iii) ‘de se belief states’. Of the 
three options, (iii) seems to be the most promising. Nevertheless, I shall show that 
mainly due to the neo-Lockean commitment to CI, none of them can be taken to 
retain neo-Lockeanism. 
 Relativised Propositions: The idea of the first option is that propositions are 
true or false relative to certain indexes. Hence regarding the belief that I am 
making a mess, instead of being true or false simplicitor, it is true or false relative 
to an index. In doing so, we give up ABSOLUTENESS. Applying it to the messy 
shopper case, we say Perry’s belief that I am making a mess is true for an index—
a particular person, Perry, the one who is making a mess.  But, as noted by Perry, 
this doesn’t seem to identify the crucial belief that led Perry to change his 
behaviour. Perry could believe that the belief that I am making a mess is true iff it 
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is true relative to Perry42 without changing his behaviour. For he might forget his 
name and thus wouldn’t realise he himself is the index that he is calling “John 
Perry”. In addition, “You believe so now, and doubtless have no more desire to 
mess up supermarkets than I did. But you are not bending over to straighten up a 
sack of sugar.” (p.13). Perry would change his behaviour if the belief he has is 
such that that I am making a mess is true for me, which brings up the indexical 
again. By EXPLANATION, the non-indexicalised truth condition doesn’t identify the 
same belief as the one with indexicalised truth condition.  
 Back to personal pronoun revisionism, suppose the truth conditions for 
propositions are relative to indexes. Originally, we say the animal’s belief that I am 
so-and-so is true for me. By personal pronoun revisionism, the ‘me’ in the truth 
condition refers to the person who thinks the I-thought (RR) instead of the thinker 
of the I-thought (NR). But in doing so we will no longer preserve the explanatory 
force of the original indexicalised truth condition as we have seen before. This 
solution thus fails for independent reasons discussed. In fact we can modify the 
first argument from ‘I’ as content of an indexical belief to ‘I’ as an index of the truth 
condition for an indexical belief, and re-run the argument. This way, the solution 
would fail for related reasons in this modified argument43. 
 Limited Accessibility: The second solution appeals to the limited 
accessibility of indexical beliefs. Given the constraint posed by CI and Noonan’s 
commitment to materialism, it is hard to see how the temporally coincident 
Lockean person and thinking animal composed of exact same material substances 																																																								
42 or to a definite description that picks out Perry alone; or he could have a de re belief that 
someone is making a mess in the his mirror case: “Suppose there were mirrors at either end of the 
counter so that as I pushed my cart down the aisle in pursuit I saw myself in the mirror. I take what 
I see to be the reflection of the messy shopper going up the aisle on the other side, not realizing 
that what I am really seeing is a reflection of a reflection of myself.” (1979, p.12) 
43 Even if we take a step back and apply it to the coincident case anyway, it still fails. Consider the 
following relativised belief that I am hungry the truth condition of which is such that it is true for me. 
By RR, the belief is true for the person who thinks the I-thought. By CI, the animal also has the 
same belief that I am hungry, but it is true relative to the Lockean person and false relative to the 
thinking animal on the neo-Lockan view. We may expect the belief that I am hungry will lead to 
certain behaviour, for instance, buy ice-cream. If we take the perspective of the person, it seems 
right to expect her to perform buy ice-cream. The fact that her belief is true seems to explain her 
behaviour. Then, by CI, we should expect the non-person thinker has just the same motive for 
performing such action. But if we subscribe to the relativised proposition view, it seems to follow 
that it is her false belief that I am hungry that leads her to perform buy ice-cream. The truth and 
falsity of a belief cannot explain the behaviour caused, for the true belief and the false belief are the 
same in motivating one’s behaviour. What else, given CI, can we appeal to then? 
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but nevertheless each of them has private indexical beliefs (this point was covered 
at the end of Section 6.2, I shall not repeat here). 
 Belief States: The idea of Perry’s third solution is to reject AGREEMENT 
and introduce a new entity that can play the role that contents are supposed to 
play. Such entity is belief states: 
 
“I propose we look at things in this way. The shoppers, for example, are all in a certain 
belief state, a state which, given normal desires and other belief states they can be 
expected to be in, will lead each of them to examine his cart.” (p.18) 
 
 Perry, the shopper in the messy shopper case, is one of the shoppers in the 
quote whose behaviour was caused by such belief state. Since beliefs states play 
the role that we expect contents to play, they are, like beliefs (or propositions), 
content-like entities. So we have two content-like entities, beliefs and belief 
states44. To see how AGREEMENT is rejected, we shall refer to the bear attack 
case once again. Both you and I agree that I am being traced by a bear. There is 
some content expressed by the utterance ‘I am being traced by a bear’ by me and 
the utterance ‘You are being traced by a bear’ uttered by you in which you and I 
mutually agree. This agreed content is captured by the content-like entity beliefs. 
By EXPLANATION, there must be some content difference in mine and your 
believing that explains our different behaviours. This is captured by the content-
like entity belief states. So taking into account the totality of content-like entities 
mine believing and your believing don’t have the same content, for they differ in 
belief states. Hence, AGREEMENT is rejected45. 
 However, given the neo-Lockean commitment to CI, it is difficult to see how 
the temporary coincident thinkers can differ in their belief states. I conclude that 
despite the ingenuity of Perry’s proposal, it is not one that the neo-Lockean 
theorist can employ. 
																																																								
44 The underlying assumption is that believing is not a two-place relation between a believer and a 
content. 
45 Further elaboration, see Ninan 2015 section 4.2 p. 29-30 
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6. Conclusion 
 I shall sum up what I have shown and argued in this thesis.  
 In an attempt to refute the thinking animal argument as an argument 
against neo-Lockeanism which he favours, Noonan accepts the coincident case 
(too many thinkers case): there exist two thinkers, the Lockean person and the 
thinking animal, which are i) temporarily coincident entities and ii) cognitively 
identical (CI). According to the animalist Olsen, this will lead to the epistemic 
problem. Drawing on the distinction between thinkers of I-thoughts and objects of 
first-person reference, and the revised rule for the reference of ‘I’ RR, Noonan 
argues that the epistemic problem can be resolved. 
 I have argued in Section 5 that RR and CI are in tension with the received 
view on de se attitudes. For considering problems of de se attitudes, I claim that i) 
both coincident thinkers are capable of thinking de se, and ii) their de se beliefs 
have different contents. It follows from (i) that the epistemic problem returns, and 
from (ii) that CI is false. In the face of the epistemic problem and the falsehood of 
CI, I finally conclude that we have strong motivation to regard the neo-Lockeanism 
Noonan favours as not true. 
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Appendix: Noonan’s Psychological Continuity Account 
 The Psychological Continuity View (neo-Lockeanism): Noonan’s 
position is that P1 at t1 is the same person as P2 at t2 if and only if P2 is 
psychologically continuous with P1 at t1. The psychological connections between 
P2 and P1 are “any causal links between past factors and present psychological 
traits”, and “hold when a belief or a desire or any other psychological feature, 
persists” (1989/2003 p.10). Compare, the Memory Criterion by Locke, which states 
that P1 at t1 is the same person as P2 at t2 iff P2 has the memory of P146. 
Noonan’s view inherits the psychological aspect of Locke’s view, but in a more 
inclusive way, with emphasis on continuity.  
 Quinean Kind-membership Framework: Noonan suggests that the 
philosophical questions of a person’s identity over time such as “what are the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for P1 at t1 to be the same person as P2 at 
t2?” should be rephrased to ones about an entity’s diachronic personhood47 such 
as “what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for an entity x to be a person 
from t1 to t2?”48. More precisely, what we set to find out is the necessary condition 
for something to be a member of the kind we call ‘Person’49. According to Noonan, 
the necessary conditions for x to be a person is captured by the following de dicto 
principles:  
 
‘Passing-away’ condition: necessarily, if x is a person then if x exists at t and  
    t* then Rxtt*; 
 
																																																								
46 ’Consciousness’ is the word Locke used in his original formulation. I interpret what me meant 
was memories. 
47 “This, then, I suggest, is what the request for ‘a criterion of diachronic identity for K’s’, or an 
account of what constitutes K-identity over time, comes down to when properly expressed. It would 
perhaps be better described as a request for ‘the diachronic criterion of K-hood’. 1989/2003 p.89 
48 It is because he follows Lewis (1986: 192-3) in thinking that the only identity relation is absolute 
identity (1989/2003) p.85, the specification of the satisfaction conditions of which is unproblematic, 
trivial and uninformative in that genuine problems cannot even arise. By rephrasing the question 
into an enquiry about diachronic personhood genuine questions such as how to informatively 
specify the criterion of personal ‘identity’ over time can arise. 
49 The original idea of which is taken from Quine (1976) but free of the commitment to the 
existence of temporal parts of physical objects (1989/2003 p.87) 
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Preservation condition:  necessarily, if x is a person then if Rxtt* then x   
    exists at t and t*  
 
(Noonan 2010, p.84, schemas in Noonan 1989/2003, p. 88) 
 
 The phrase ‘persistence conditions for persons’ is construed as the 
specification of the relations R in the principles. Since this is what is at issue in the 
kind-membership framework, phrases such as ‘criterion of personal identity over 
time’, ‘necessary and sufficient condition for P1 at t1 to be the same person as P2 
at t2’ shall be understood with reference to the above de dicto principles governing 
the kind called person.  
 Conceptual Enquiry: Noonan thinks that finding out the persistence 
conditions of persons is a matter of conceptual enquiry. Persons are therefore 
members of the extension of the concept person. To give an adequate analysis of 
the concept person is to specify the persistence conditions without using the very 
concept person50. To find out the extension of the concept person, what one has to 
do is to apply the concept of person in various epistemically possible thought 
experiments. An example would be the Gettier case. The concept knowledge was 
traditionally analysed as justified true beliefs. However, in the Gettier case, a 
subject has a justified true belief P but we have the intuition that she doesn’t know 
that P. Such intuition is from the application of the concept of knowledge. “Mutatis 
mutandis, we can ask whether, in circumstances described in a certain way, 
without appeal to that concept, the concept of personal identity would have 
application” (1989/2003, p. 196). The concept of personal identity, that is, the 
concept of person when applied to cases concerning persistence is a substance 
sortal: if an entity x fails to be a member of a substance sortal, x ceases to exist. 
Contrasting phrase sortal: if an entity x fails to be a member of a phrase sortal, it 
would continue to exist as a member of another sortal concept51. 
 
																																																								
50 “The hope is that such conditions can be informatively specified, i.e. can be specified without the 
use of the very concept K which is being analysed” 1989/2003 p.88 
51 Being a kitten will be an example of a phrase sortal 
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 The Transplant Intuition: The Transplant Intuition refers to the intuition we 
have regarding a brain transplant case in which A’s brain is transferred to B’s body 
with consequent psychological traits. The intuition is that when the surgery is done 
and the B-body person who has A’s brain and psychological traits wakes up, we 
identify that person is A. In other words, we have the intuition that the person goes 
where psychological life goes. Presumably, the Transplant Intuition will be induced 
in any case that has the same structure, including the Brown/Brownson case by 
Shoemaker and the Prince/Cobbler case by Locke. Noonan suggests that the 
argument from the Transplant Intuition is the “foremost objection to the Biological 
Approach (1989/2003 p.192)” and “can perhaps be better appreciated if it is seen 
as the outcome of a typical philosophical thought experiment.” (1989/2003, p.195) 
 The Indeterminacy Thesis: Noonan endorses that it is possible that one’s 
personal identity over time is indeterminate, and calls this type of cases ‘borderline 
case’. In particular, the borderline cases he identifies are the Brown/Brownson 
case and the Methuselah case. In a borderline case, “the statement of identity in 
question is determinately neither true nor false because of the vagueness inherent 
in our concept of personal identity, and consequently it is neither determinately 
true nor determinately false that the original person in the case still exists after the 
various events in it have occurred” (1989/2003 p. 105). Rejecting the metaphysical 
view on vagueness, he argues for the semantic view (p.110-5, 2013) on 
vagueness, and employs it in the course of explaining the indeterminacy in the 
borderline cases he identifies (p.115-9). In this view, indeterminacy in the truth-
value of the identity statement arises from referential indeterminacy of one of the 
terms employed in the identity statement.  
 Noonan’s main argument for his neo-Lockean account is thus largely based 
on the Transplant Intuition and that the concept of personal identity is structured 
around a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. He argues that the Transplant 
Intuition is something that we must accommodate in giving an adequate theory of 
personal identity over time. Since neither the attempt of explaining it nor that of 
explaining it away is successful52, the only reasonable thing to say is that the 
Transplant Intuition confirms that neo-Lockeanism is true, unless there is a special 																																																								
52 Noonan 1989/2002 p.197-201 
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reason for casting doubts upon the method of cases or the structure of the concept 
of personal identity.  
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